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ABSTRACT 
The Group of Eight (G8) is one of the most prestigious forums to which Canada belongs. It represents an 
avenue through which the Canadian government can exercise its opinion on a number of economic and political 
issues. At the G8 summits in Genoa, Italy (2001) and Kananaskis, Alberta (2002), the Liberal Government of 
Canada, led by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, ensured that African poverty reduction was a central concern to the 
group. In 2001, authors of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) presented their plan to the G8. 
G8 leaders responded with the African Action Plan (AAP). At the Kananaskis summit, G8 leaders focused on 
African development issues, the specifics of which were addressed in the AAP. Prime Minister Chrétien took the 
lead in these efforts, developing domestic policies (such as the Canada Fund for Africa and the promises made at 
the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico) and working through the 
international concert of the G8. 
 This thesis adapts John Kingdon’s public policy model, the Multiple Streams model, to analyze Canadian 
foreign policy. It studies how and why African development rose to the top of the agenda for Canada and the G8 in 
the early 2000s. It illustrates how Prime Minister Chrétien became a Policy Entrepreneur, both in Canada and 
within the G8. It argues that the streams of problem, policy and politics aligned and that Chrétien was able to 
couple them, pushing them through a policy window and affecting real policy change. It concludes that, while the 
Multiple Streams model lacks in predictive power, it is an excellent tool through which to understand policy 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
  Development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa represents one of the most politically charged and enduring 
elements of Canadian foreign policy.1  Canada’s aid efforts are conducted both bilaterally and multilaterally, 
through a variety of institutions, including the Group of Eight (G8). The G8 is an international forum that deals 
with important political and economic matters, of which Canada is a key member. It has been contended that 
Canada’s “engagement with Africa...has waxed and waned throughout the decolonization era,” however much of 
its relations with Africa have been “been motivated by its multilateral affiliations.”2 This thesis will explore 
Canada’s position on Africa through one of these multilateral instruments: the G8. 
One of the most fascinating G8 summits, which led to a great deal of innovation, was held in Kananaskis, 
Alberta in the summer of 2002. Hosted by Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (1993-2003), the summit 
resulted in major policy developments in Canada’s relationship with Africa. The G8 had been active on African 
issues for several years, but the 2002 summit represented a high point in relations. Despite the pervasive concern of 
terrorism in the post-September 11th environment, Chrétien was able to effectively keep the G8 agenda focused on 
African development. This was a noteworthy achievement, worthy of exploration. Using John Kingdon’s Multiple 
Streams (MS) policy model, this thesis argues that the Kananaskis summit was a clear case of a policy window 
opening as a direct result of Chrétien’s effective leadership at the summit, at which he acted as a Policy 
Entrepreneur (PE). 
1.2 Focus, Objectives and Research Questions 
 
 The thesis will commence by examining the Genoa, Italy summit held in 2001. It was at Genoa that much 
of the attention to African began in earnest for the G8. The overview of the Genoa summit will demonstrate how 
Chrétien began engineering partnerships, progress and results in advance of the 2002 summit. Over the course of 
Genoa and Kananaskis, the African Action Plan (AAP) was proposed, developed and agreed upon by the G8. The 
AAP was a response to the African-led New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative. NEPAD, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  From	  this	  point	  on,	  “Africa”	  refers	  to	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  not	  the	  entire	  continent,	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated.	  
2	  David	  Black,	  “From	  Kananaskis	  to	  Gleneagles—Assessing	  ‘Leadership’	  on	  Africa,”	  Behind	  the	  Headlines	  62,	  no.	  3	  (4	  May	  2005),	  4.	  
3	  Paul	  A.	  Sabatier,	  “The	  Need	  for	  Better	  Theories”	  in	  Paul	  A.	  Sabatier,	  ed.	  Theories	  of	  the	  Policy	  Process.	  (Colorado:	  Westview	  Press,	  
1999),	  6.	  
4	  While	  this	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  the	  creation	  and	  innovation	  of	  Canada’s	  foreign	  policy-­‐making	  in	  Africa	  as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  MS	  model,	  
2	  David	  Black,	  “From	  Kananaskis	  to	  Gleneagles—Assessing	  ‘Leadership’	  on	  Africa,”	  Behind	  the	  Headlines	  62,	  no.	  3	  (4	  May	  2005),	  4.	  
	  	  
	  2	  
which was created by African leaders, aimed to generate political and economic renewal for the region. The thesis 
explores Canada’s use of the G8 as a tool through which to increase its aid commitment to Africa. Furthermore, it 
evaluates Chrétien's role in propelling African development to the top of the agenda both in Canada and 
internationally in the early 2000s. In order to accomplish these goals, this thesis seeks to address the following 
questions: 
1) How and why did African development assistance become a priority for Canada in the early 2000s? 
2) How and why did Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien act as a leader and innovator (Policy 
Entrepreneur-PE) in this case? 
 Kingdon’s MS model is an excellent tool with which to examine Canada’s role in African development, 
both through the G8 and domestically in 2001 and 2002. The MS model provides a basis for comprehending how 
an idea becomes policy. This thesis contends that the three streams (problem, policy and politics) aligned, and a PE 
was able to “couple” them, resulting in the opening of a policy window. As a consequence of Chrétien’s efforts, 
several policies were adopted. At the national level, these policies were the Canada Fund for Africa and the 
Monterrey Consensus. Internationally, Chrétien’s leadership, and the activism of his G8 allies, resulted in the 
adoption of the AAP.   The pressures of the summit process were crucial for the success of these developments. 
This thesis focuses on the creation and innovation of policy as interpreted by the MS model. Kingdon’s 
concept is a model as opposed to a conceptual framework or a theory. Elinor Ostrom (1999) states that, “a model is 
a representation of a specific situation. It is usually much narrower in scope than a conceptual framework or a 
theory, and more precise in its assumptions, than the underlying theory...Thus frameworks, theories, and models 
can be conceptualised as operating along a continuum involving increased logical interconnectedness and 
specificity, but decreasing scope.”3 The MS model seeks to explain and describe the policy process.4   
 Paul A. Sabatier, editor of Theories of the Policy Process (1999) explains that “the process of public 
policymaking includes the manner in which problems get conceptualized and brought to government for solution; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Paul	  A.	  Sabatier,	  “The	  Need	  for	  Better	  Theories”	  in	  Paul	  A.	  Sabatier,	  ed.	  Theories	  of	  the	  Policy	  Process.	  (Colorado:	  Westview	  Press,	  
1999),	  6.	  
4	  While	  this	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  the	  creation	  and	  innovation	  of	  Canada’s	  foreign	  policy-­‐making	  in	  Africa	  as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  MS	  model,	  
there	  are	  many	  models	  of	  policy-­‐making	  which	  could	  have	  been	  employed	  for	  this	  analysis.	  Other	  models	  designed	  to	  explain	  the	  
creation	  and	  success	  of	  policy-­‐making	  include	  the	  advocacy	  coalition	  framework	  of	  Hank	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  and	  Paul	  Sabatier	  and	  the	  
punctuated	  equilibrium	  model,	  by	  Bryan	  Jones	  and	  Frank	  Baumgarner.	  In	  the	  advocacy	  coalition	  framework,	  people	  come	  together	  to	  
solve	  a	  problem	  because	  they	  have	  comparable	  knowledge	  of	  the	  issue	  and	  a	  common	  interest	  in	  seeing	  the	  issue	  rectified.	  	  In	  their	  
model,	  Jones	  and	  Baumgarner	  contend	  that	  ‘policies	  and	  agendas,	  rather	  than	  changing	  gradually	  over	  time,	  actually	  shift	  rapidly	  from	  
one	  stable	  point	  to	  another.’	  The	  advocacy	  coalition	  framework,	  punctuated	  equilibrium	  model	  and	  MS	  model	  are	  each	  analyzed	  by	  
Brian	  W.	  Tomlin,	  Norman	  Hilmer	  and	  Fen	  Osler	  Hampson	  (2008)	  in	  Canada’s	  International	  Policies:	  Agendas,	  Alternatives	  and	  Politics.	  
Tomlin	  et	  al	  conclude	  that	  the	  MS	  model	  is	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  of	  the	  three	  and	  observe	  that	  the	  MS	  model	  is	  in	  fact	  able	  to	  
subsume	  the	  advocacy	  coalition	  framework	  and	  punctuated	  equilibrium	  model	  within	  its	  structure.	  Brian	  W.	  Tomlin,	  Norman	  Hillmer	  
and	  Fen	  Osler	  Hampson,	  Canada’s	  International	  Policies:	  Agendas,	  Alternatives,	  and	  Politics	  (Toronto:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  22.	  
	  	  
	  3	  
governmental institutions formulate alternatives and select policy solutions; and those solutions get implemented, 
evaluated, and revised.”5 Because the policy process is highly complex, and involves numerous actors, one must 
attempt to simplify the situation through a theoretical lens.6 Kingdon's MS model provides that lens for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
1.3 Organization of Thesis 
 In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this thesis has four chapters. Each chapter has a unique goal, 
intended to inform the overall objectives of the thesis. Chapter two is dedicated to a fuller discussion of Kingdon’s 
MS model. It explains the model in detail and outlines its purpose and methods. It addresses some of its limitations 
and provides a brief overview of the variety of ways the model can be applied. This is done through an 
examination of past applications of the model. The purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with the MS 
model and to argue that it can be used in a wide range of cases, including the one explored by this thesis. 
 The purpose of chapter three is to acquaint readers with Canada’s role in African development initiatives 
both nationally and through the G8, as well as to introduce the origins of NEPAD and the AAP.  Chapter three 
presents background on Canadian international development assistance in the 20th century and on Canada’s role in 
the G8. It also provides an overview of the Genoa summit of 2001, where NEPAD was introduced and the idea for 
an AAP originated.  The Genoa summit served as a catalyst for further action at the Kananaskis summit in 2002.  
 Chapter four is designed to in the policy decisions made by the G8 and the Government of Canada, both in 
the period between the Genoa and Kananaskis summits, and at Kananaskis itself. It provides insight into the 
purpose of Canadian initiatives and discusses the Kananaskis summit, highlighting the achievements in African aid 
and development policy. The background provided in chapters three and four sets the stage for the analytical 
discussion of African development policy in chapter five. 
Chapter five applies the MS model to the case of Canadian development assistance to Africa in 2001 and 
2002, both domestically and multilaterally. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how and why Canada led the 
G8 in the adoption of new and innovative development policies for Africa.  Chapter five focuses on how Jean 
Chrétien acted as PE, illustrating how he ensured that change was implemented, both nationally and 
internationally.  
1.4 Contribution of Thesis 
This research is important for several reasons. The G8 is a highly influential forum. There have been 
persistent discussions about the relevance of the G8, and the calibre of its international contribution. This thesis 
addresses the strides which Canada and the G8 made in supporting and fostering African development in the early 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Sabatier,	  3.	  
6	  Ibid.,	  4.	  
	  	  
	  4	  
2000s. There is great value in the discussion of Canadian aid during this time, as the nation has endured criticism 
for its lack of action in development policy and ODA. The application of the MS model demonstrates its power as 
a tool to understand the creation and rise of ideas in policy communities. The subject of this thesis is worth 
exploring because it contributes to the literature on Jean Chrétien and Canadian aid policy through the G8. It also 
fills a gap in the MS literature, demonstrating how a nation’s top leader can act as a Policy Entrepreneur.  
1.5 Overview of the Study  
 The material used to inform this thesis is drawn from both primary and secondary sources.  The primary 
sources include government documents, such as speeches, policy papers and non-governmental reports and 
publications. Many of these documents come from the Government of Canada, while others are G8 communiqués 
accessed through the University of Toronto’s G8 Information Centre. Secondary sources are used extensively. 
They provide context, criticism and comments on primary source materials, and inform the explanation of the MS 


















Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework: The Multiple Streams Model 
  
This chapter presents an overview of the Multiple Streams (MS) Model, the theoretical model informing 
this thesis. The MS model was created by John W. Kingdon in 1984. It explains the process of policy formation, 
specifically, the processes of agenda setting and decision making, and is a “significant theoretical breakthrough in 
the field of public policy.” 7  This chapter will detail the MS model and briefly explore some of the cases to which 
the MS model has been applied, demonstrating how it has contributed to the literature on policy and policy 
analysis.  
2.1 Introduction to the Multiple Streams Model 
The MS Model has its origins in the “Garbage Can Model” (GCM) created by Michael Cohen, James G. 
March, and Johan P. Olsen.  In the authors’ much cited article “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice” 
(1972), they point to “problematic preferences, unclear technology and fluid participation” as the main 
characteristics of organized anarchies.8  Organized anarchies are places such as academic institutions, businesses 
and governments, which contain ill-defined and often inconsistent choices and preferences.  Cohen et al. note that 
organizations can be viewed as places where choices are collected and chosen from.9 The authors explain that, 
 Although organizations can often be viewed conveniently as vehicles for solving well-defined 
problems (…) they also provide sets of procedures through which participants arrive at an 
interpretation of what they are doing and what they have done while in the process of doing 
it…an organization is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking 
for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they 
might be the answer, and decision-makers looking for work.10 
 
In Cohen et al.’s model, problems and solutions are placed within a “garbage can.” Participants are free to 
pick and choose from within, pairing problems with solutions as they see fit.  This model uses four streams to 
analyze the policy process: problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities.11 The authors contend 
that the model “enable[s] choices to be made and problems to be resolved, even when the organization is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Xufeng	  Zhu,	  “Strategy	  of	  Chinese	  Policy	  Entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  Third	  Sector:	  Challenges	  of	  ‘Technical	  Infeasibility,”	  Policy	  Sciences	  41,	  
no.4	  (December	  2008),	  317.	  
8	  Michael	  Cohen,	  James	  G.	  March	  and	  Johan	  P.	  Olsen,	  “A	  Garbage	  Can	  Model	  of	  Organizational	  Choice,”	  Administrative	  Science	  Quarterly	  
17,	  no.	  1	  (March	  1972),	  1.	  
9	  Ibid.	  	  
10	  Ibid.,	  2.	  
11	  Steffen	  Brunner,	  “Understanding	  Policy	  Change:	  Multiple	  Streams	  and	  Emissions	  Trading	  in	  Germany,”	  Global	  Environmental	  Change	  
18,	  no.	  3	  (2008),	  501.	  
	  	  
	  6	  
plagued with goal ambiguity and conflict, with poorly understood problems that wander in and out of the 
system, with a variable environment, and with decision makers who may have other things on their minds.”12 
 It is from this theoretical basis that the Multiple Stream (MS) model originates. The MS model starts 
from a similar starting point: a concern for how problems are developed and solutions are chosen. However, 
the MS emphasizes the organized aspects of decision- making agendas, whereas Cohen et al.’s model is 
focused on the random and anarchical nature of organizations.13 Though there is an emphasis on the orderly 
aspects of the way decisions are made, Kingdon acknowledges the role which chaos and ambiguity play in 
the policy process, as well as the importance of self-interest in decision making.14  The MS model 
incorporates elements of both chaos and rationality in attempting to determine how and why policies develop 
when “assumptions of clarity and self interest” are not able to adequately explain policy decisions.15   
In Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (1984), Kingdon seeks to determine how and why an 
“idea’s time has come,” how issues become issues and how agendas form and change.16  His model 
emphasizes the power of ideas.17 Kingdon poses the question: in a world where there are an endless number 
of worthy problems and solutions, how and why do some issues become prominent on policy agendas while 
others to not? His model investigates why some alternatives are considered and chosen while others are not.18 
Kingdon demonstrates the value of his policy model by employing twenty three case studies relating to 
policy in the heath and transportation departments of the American (US) government. Though created with 
US public policy in mind, academics have demonstrated the far reaching applicability of the MS model into 
realms beyond domestic public policy, something discussed later in this chapter.  
Kingdon conceives of three streams in the MS model: a problem stream, a policy stream and a political 
stream. Each stream operates independently, with its own direction and activity.19 Issues come to receive attention 
on the policy agenda because a problem is recognized, a solution to the problem becomes available and because the 
political atmosphere makes the time right for change.20 When the three streams converge, the model dictates that a 
“policy window” or “window of opportunity” will open, making change possible. Windows can be spontaneous or 
predicable, and typically do not remain open for long. An opportunity must be seized immediately or else is likely 
to be lost. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Cohen	  et	  al.,	  16.	  
13	  Tomlin	  et	  al.,22.	  
14	  Nikolaos	  Zahariadis,	  “Ambiguity,	  Time,	  and	  Multiple	  Streams,”	  in	  Paul	  A.	  Sabatier,	  ed.	  Theories	  of	  the	  Policy	  Process	  (Colorado:	  
Westview	  Press,	  1999),	  73-­‐90.	  
15	  Ibid.,	  87.	  
16John	  Kingdon,	  Agendas,	  Alternatives	  and	  Public	  Policies	  (New	  York:	  Longman,	  1984).	  
17	  Brunner,	  501.	  	  
18	  Kingdon,	  3.	  
19	  Rick	  Travis	  and	  Nikolaos	  Zahariadis,	  “A	  Multiple	  Streams	  Model	  of	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Aid	  Policy,”	  Policy	  Studies	  Journal	  30,	  no.	  4	  (Winter	  
2002),	  496.	  
20	  Gary	  Mucciaroni,	  “The	  Garbage	  Can	  Model	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  Policy	  Making:	  A	  Critique,”	  Polity	  24,	  no.	  3	  (Spring	  1992),	  460.	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Kingdon emphasizes that policy making is not a linear or straightforward process. Rather, the streams 
proceed independently until a policy window opens and they are coupled by a policy entrepreneur (PE). A policy 
cannot be pushed through a policy window without a PE. These fascinating political actors are “highly 
knowledgeable, committed individuals” who become advocates of a particular policy. They do so for a variety of 
reasons, including in order to advance personal goals, to promote their beliefs or values, or simply because they 
“like the game.”21  They work tirelessly and creatively to ensure that their ideas receive a favourable reception. 
They mobilize people and resources to highlight a problem and a potential policy solution, and invest time and 
effort towards coupling the streams.  Entrepreneurs sometimes “bend ideological proclivities” in order to capitalize 
on opportunities, and often have excellent reasoning and negotiation skills. They are eloquent, tenacious and 
persuasive.  PEs work with constituencies to support certain policies.22   Oftentimes, solutions to a problem can be 
developed before a problem has been fully elaborated. Policy makers will create a solution and wait for a problem 
to attach it to. Conversely, politicians may try to promote a particular cause or issue, but until a solution comes 
along and a policy window opens, little will come of his or her efforts.23 
 Gary Mucciaroni, who has used Kingdon’s model extensively in his work, defines PEs as “highly 
knowledgeable, committed individuals—in or out of government—who are willing to invest their resources to join 
the streams together.”24 These resources include time, energy, reputation, and money, and are employed to 
“promote a position in return for anticipated future gains in the form of material, purposive, or solidarity 
benefits.”25 These individuals are not unique to one location, can be found both inside and outside of government 
structures, and often have political connections.26 PEs search for unresolved situations and link them with potential 
remedies. They “bear the reputational, financial, and emotional risks of uncertainty and aim to resolve collective 
action problems such as free riding.”27 PEs are central to the MS model, and their role cannot be overstated. Once 
the three streams align, a PE must couple them into a single package and push them through an open policy 
window. The MS model joins unique and independent activities of policy making under one theoretical 
framework.28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Kingdon,	  204.	  
22	  Kingdon,	  204-­‐205.	  
23	  Karen	  Evans	  Stout	  and	  Byron	  Stevens,	  “The	  Case	  of	  the	  Failed	  Diversity	  Rule:	  A	  Multiple	  Streams	  Analysis,”	  Educational	  Evaluation	  and	  
Policy	  Analysis	  22,	  no.	  4	  (2000),	  342.	  
24	  Mucciaroni,	  461.	  
25	  Kingdon,	  179.	  
26	  Ibid.,	  181.	  
27	  	  Zhu,	  316.	  
28	  Zahariadis,	  “Ambiguity,	  Time	  and	  Multiple	  Streams,”	  89.	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2.2 The Three Streams Explained 
The problem, policy and political stream are each dynamic in their own way.  The operation of each is 
crucial for the overall success of a policy being pushed through a policy window by a PE.  
i. The Problem Stream: 
 In Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Kingdon explores how and why certain problems capture the 
attention of people in government.29 The problem stream is where individuals recognize an issue which needs to be 
addresses. Indicators are one of the most prevalent means through which problems are brought to the attention of 
governments and society at large. Indicators “abound in the political world because both governmental and 
nongovernmental agencies routinely monitor various activities and events.”30 Indicators come in the form of 
budgetary expenditures and academic studies, and are used by decision makers primarily to determine the scope 
and seriousness of a problem and to monitor change to a problem. Those in government monitor indicators to 
assess change.31  
At times, problems are not obvious; it takes a focusing event, such as a crisis or a disaster, to bring it to 
people’s attention. They can also appear to individuals in the form of a personal experience or symbol.32 Focusing 
events are important because they draw attention to a problem, thereby increasing its likelihood of rising onto the 
governmental and decision-making agenda. 
 Feedback is the third element of the problem stream. Governments receive feedback regarding existing 
programs and operations from the public, either formally or informally. Feedback demonstrates that a problem 
exists and that action is required. Feedback appears through various channels, including impact evaluation studies 
and letters from constituents.33 It can also come through the systematic monitoring of existing plans and policies or 
the experience of bureaucrats.34  
Since problems are not always obvious, it is through indicators, feedback and focusing events that problems 
find their place on the governmental and decision-making agendas.35 While some problems receive attention, 
others fall off the agenda entirely. This happens if those in and around government believe that a problem has been 
sufficiently dealt with or solved or because insufficient attention has been paid to an action surrounding a problem. 
It takes “time, effort, mobilization of many actors and the expenditure of political resources to keep an item 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Kingdon,	  87.	  
30	  Ibid.	  
31	  Ibid.,	  90-­‐91.	  Also	  see	  Travis	  and	  Zahariadis,	  496.	  
32	  Kingdon	  holds	  symbols	  to	  be	  important	  as	  they	  can	  ‘capture	  in	  a	  nutshell	  some	  sort	  of	  reality	  that	  people	  already	  sense	  in	  a	  vaguer,	  
more	  diffuse	  way.’	  Kingdon.,	  94,	  96-­‐98.	  	  
33	  Travis	  and	  Zahariadis,	  ‘A	  Multiple	  Streams	  Model	  of	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Aid	  Policy.’	  	  496.	  
34	  Kingdon,	  101.	  
35	  Tomlin	  et	  al.,	  24.	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prominent on the agenda.”36 For these reasons, many of the problems circulating in policy communities are not 
addressed, and it is only through indicators, feedback and focusing events that they receive attention. 
ii. The Policy Stream 
The policy stream is where a variety of policy alternatives are articulated.  Policymakers are aware of many 
existing problems, but due to time and resources, are able to create only a limited number of solutions.37 Policy 
communities, or “communities of specialists,” are active in this stream. Kingdon conceives of policy communities 
as processes of evolution, where ideas are generated. Ideas rise and fall, changing as they evolve, until advocates of 
a particular policy are able to propose their idea to a wider audience.38 The process resembles what Kindgon calls 
“primeval soup.” Ideas generated by members of policy communities “float” around. Some become increasingly 
prominent, while others fade out. Ideas can collide, or combine into a single idea. Others lose out to a competing 
idea.  
Policy communities, which include “bureaucrats, congressional staff members, academics, and researchers 
in think tanks,” are fragmented to different degrees, due to variations in group cohesiveness. 39 This produces 
varying results; greater fragmentation can lead to instability.40  Policy prescriptions are far more likely to be 
adopted if both the policy communities and the general public have been, in Kingdon’s words, “softened up” to the 
particular idea.  As policy alternatives are developed, the softening up process takes place.41 Consensus-building 
occurs in the policy stream, through diffusion and persuasion. 42 Decision-makers are convinced of the merits of a 
policy through the persuasive efforts of PEs. Diffusion occurs through “bandwagoning,”which is similar to a 
snowball effect. This is how ideas become more popular.43 People will jump on the bandwagon over time if they 
believe a policy is well suited for a problem or if they fear losing out by not joining. It is here that entrepreneurs 
attempt to convince the public and members of government to adopt what Kingdon labels their “pet solution.” 
Consensus-building ensures that individuals in and around government are willing to support policy 
initiatives. Softening up generates excitement about a policy prior to its adoption. If an idea is thought to be 
feasible and relevant, consensus begins to spread throughout the policy community and beyond, increasing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Kindgon,	  104.	  
37	  Zahariadis,	  Nikolaos,	  “Selling	  British	  Rail:	  An	  Idea	  Whose	  Time	  Had	  Come?”	  Comparative	  Political	  Studies	  29,	  no.	  4	  (August	  1996),	  407.	  
38	  Kingdon,	  116.	  
39	  Ibid.,	  118-­‐119	  and	  Travis	  and	  Zahariadis,	  496.	  
40	  Chris	  N.	  Burgess,	  “Multiple	  Streams	  and	  Policy	  Community	  Dynamics:	  The	  1990	  NEA	  Independent	  Commission.”	  The	  Ohio	  State	  
University,	  Occasional	  Paper	  #23.	  Presented	  at	  the	  28th	  Annual	  Social	  Theory,	  Politics	  and	  Arts	  Conference,	  2002.	  Available	  online:	  
<https://arted.osu.edu/files/arted/paper23.pdf>	  (22	  October	  2010),	  24.	  
41	  Softening	  up	  includes	  making	  people	  familiar	  with	  an	  idea	  or	  policy	  alternative	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  more	  comfortable	  and	  
potentially	  more	  willing	  to	  accept	  the	  prescription.	  Zahariadis,	  “Ambiguity,	  Time	  and	  Multiple	  Streams,”	  86.	  	  
42	  Tomlin	  et	  al.,	  25.	  
43	  This	  diffusion	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  ‘growing	  realization’	  or	  a	  ‘widespread	  feeling.’	  Kingdon,	  140-­‐1.	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chances of its eventual adoption. 44 The wider policy community and the public must be introduced to the idea as 
well. This ensures that when an idea’s time has come, the public is ready to accept it.45 While ideas come and go 
and fall in and out of favour in the policy stream, they rarely disappear entirely. They may be redesigned or fused 
with another idea to form a new combination. Entirely new material, however, is not common.46 As Kingdom 
reminds us, “There is no new idea under the sun.”47  
Kingdon differentiates between two agendas in the policy stream: the governmental agenda and the 
decision agenda. The governmental agenda is the “list of subjects to which governmental officials and those around 
them are paying serious attention.”48 This agenda can include specialized agenda items as well as more general 
items. The decision agenda consists of matters “within the governmental agenda that are up for an active 
decision.”49 Both are important to the model and provide information about what stage of consideration a policy 
proposal has reached. 
 
iii. The Political Stream: 
Developments occurring in the political stream have the most significant effects on the decision-making 
and governmental agendas.50 Influences on this stream include “swings in national mood, vagaries of public 
opinion, election results, changes of administration [turnover]... and interest group pressure campaigns.”51 
Jurisdictional matters and “organized political forces” are also crucial elements in this stream. Organized political 
forces refer to the pressure exerted by interest groups, the behaviour of political elites and political mobilization.52 
Each factor is imperative to the outcome in this stream and exert influence in different ways.  
 National mood has significant and far-reaching consequences for the policy stream. A change in mood can 
have serious effects on the policy agenda and its subsequent outcomes. It can result in a more receptive 
environment for a particular concept, or conversely, can relegate a policy to obscurity.53 Fortunately for those in 
the policy making, there are ways to get a sense of the national mood. It can be gauged via meetings and from the 
feedback politicians receive through their offices. National mood can also be determined through polling, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Ibid.	  
45	  Ibid.,	  127.	  
46	  Ibid.,	  142.	  	  
47	  Ecclesiastes	  1:9,	  The	  Holy	  Bible:	  King	  James	  Version,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Kingdon.	  
48	  Kingdon,	  4.	  
49	  Ibid.	  
50	  Tomlin	  et	  al.,	  25.	  
51	  Kingdon,	  87.	  
52	  Ibid.,	  150	  
53	  Ibid.,	  146.	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lobbyists, the media and social movements, as well as from mail and phone calls from constituents. For politicians 
not in power, attempts to decipher the national mood often occur through the observation of those in office. 54  
Turnover and change are extremely important to the political stream. When members of government 
change, so too does the policy agenda.  New politicians bring new priorities and provide an opportunity for fresh or 
reworked policies to be considered and adopted.  Jurisdiction, more specifically disputes over jurisdiction, can play 
a significant role in the political stream. Kingdon observes that “agenda setting is affected by battles over turf, and 
some items are ignored because they are ‘defined away’ by the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries.”55  As in the 
policy stream, consensus-building is prevalent in the political stream. While consensus-building in the policy 
stream is built primarily through diffusion and persuasion, the political stream uses bargaining tactics and the 
building of coalitions to create agreements and unity.56 Coalitions are “...built through the granting of concessions 
in return for support of the coalition, or as actual or potential coalition members make bargains.”57 One joins a 
coalition not just because he or she has been “persuaded of the virtue of that course of action,” but also because he 
or she “fears that failure to join would result in exclusion from the benefits of participation.” People are persuaded 
to support a particular policy, sometimes in exchange for something else. 58  
 The problem stream is significant because it alerts the public to a current strategy which is not working 
well. The policy stream is important because ideas need time and attention to grow and evolve, to developed and 
redevelop. The political stream shapes the conditions which must be present for decision-makers to be receptive to 
new ideas and policies. The political stream is particularly important in the outcome of agendas. If a problem is 
identified, a solution is developed and the political will is in place, it is possible for a Policy Entrepreneur to 
harness the change and push a policy through an open window. It is then that change can occur.  
2.3 The Policy Window and the Policy Entrepreneur 
The streams are ready to be coupled by a policy entrepreneur (PE) when proper conditions have been 
achieved. If an entrepreneur recognizes and capitalizes on this alignment, change can occur and new policies can 
be adopted. This process is explained by Tomlin et. al.: “the three streams come together at critical times, so that a 
problem is recognized, a solution is developed and available in the policy community, a political change makes the 
time right for policy change, and potential constraints are not severe.”59  The alignment of the streams can result in 
a policy window opening. A policy window can be thought of as “a temporal stimulus for choice.”60 Windows can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Ibid.,	  149.	  
55	  Kingdon	  notes	  that	  in	  his	  study	  of	  the	  role	  of	  jurisdiction	  on	  policy	  making,	  the	  maxim	  ‘Where	  you	  stand	  depends	  upon	  where	  you	  sit’	  
rings	  particularly	  true.	  Ibid.,	  155.	  
56	  Ibid.,	  159.	  
57	  Ibid.	  
58	  Ibid.,	  159-­‐160.	  
59	  Tomlin	  et	  al.,	  26.	  
60	  Zahariadis,	  “Ambiguity,	  Time	  and	  Multiple	  Streams,”	  82.	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be predictable (such as an annual budget) or unpredictable (such as a natural disaster), but they do not remain open 
for long. Action must be taken quickly before one of the three streams shifts or changes. If this occurs, the window 
will close and the opportunity is lost.61  There is only one way to truly determine if a policy window opened: 
through a test of successful advocacy. Successful advocacy means that the policy has risen past the governmental 
agenda, onto the decision agenda, where those in government are seriously considering the proposed policy.62   
 There is another crucial element to this formula that ensures that a policy will achieve attention on the 
decision agenda. A PE is necessary to ‘couple’ or link the streams and to push an idea through the policy window. 
Coupling can be understood as searching for a proper fit between problems and solutions.63   PEs must seize the 
chance for change and persist in their efforts. PEs work to promote their idea, harnessing the energy from people 
and resources to make the adoption of their policy a reality.  They must be dedicated, experienced and willing to 
commit resources. They must have the ability to search for the right solution, and the skill to recognize when the 
time is right to act.  
In addition to have the drive and enthusiasm to couple a problem and solution on the political agenda, PEs 
must have a “claim to hearing.”64 While countless people would like to be heard, there are only a small number of 
people who have an audience. A claim to hearing can come from a PE who represents others (such as a Member of 
Parliament), a leader of an interest group, or a forerunner in his or her field (such as researcher).65 There can be 
more than one PE working to promote the adoption of a particular policy.  
 If a policy entrepreneur capitalizes on the opportunity of an open policy window, it is likely that he or she 
will be rewarded by gaining the attention of decision makers. His or her pet solution is then likely to be considered 
and adopted onto the governmental agenda and potentially the decision agenda. Ultimately, an “issue’s chance of 
gaining prominence in the agenda are enhanced when problems interact with solutions and politics to produce a 
single package acceptable to policymakers.”66  An entrepreneur is crucial to packaging an appealing solution for 
policy makers. It is at this juncture that a policy can be accepted, making change possible.  
 One comment about policy entrepreneurs as it applies to this particular case study: though it is rare that a 
high ranking political decision maker is a PE, it is not impossible. The MS model dictates that entrepreneurs can be 
“…found in many locations. No single formal position or even informal place in the political system has a 
monopoly on them...[emphasis added].” In fact, the “placement of entrepreneurs is nearly irrelevant… to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Travis	  and	  Zahariadis,	  497.	  
62	  Tomlin	  et.	  al,	  27.	  
63	  Zahariadis,	  “Selling	  British	  Rail:	  An	  Idea	  Whose	  Time	  Had	  Come?”	  403.	  
64	  Kingdon,	  180.	  
65	  Ibid.	  
66	  Travis	  and	  Zahariadis,	  “A	  Multiple	  Streams	  Model	  of	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Aid	  Policy,”	  497.	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understanding their activities or their successes,” as policy entrepreneurs will “position themselves wherever they 
consider their activities will produce the highest expected returns.”67  
Before applying the Multiple Streams model to the case study addressed in this thesis, and the role of Jean 
Chrétien as leader of African policies through the G8, it is useful to explore other studies which have employed the 
MS Model to assess policy making. 
2.4 Multiple Streams Analysis Applied 
 Kingdon’s model has been used to analyze many cases and policy decisions. This section briefly examines 
some of the most relevant applications of the MS model, and emphasizes the wide range of cases for which the MS 
model is suited. One of the most enlightening examples of the MS model applied can be found in Tomlin et al.’s 
Canada’s International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives, and Politics (2008).  The book explores the evolution of 
investment, trade, defence, development and human security policy of the Canada Government from World War II 
to present. It includes six case studies, which demonstrate the “utility of the [MS] model as a method of searching 
for pattern and structure in a very complicated, fluid and apparently unpredictable phenomena.”68 Tomlin et al. 
argue convincingly that Kingdon’s model is best suited for understanding the complexities and unforeseen 
developments in policy making.  
Steffen Brunner (2008) employs Kingdon’s framework to study emission trading in Germany. Brunner 
seeks to determine why a political turn in emission trading took place in 2007. He finds that, while the model does 
“concisely capture” many significant elements of the policy process, it is not entirely satisfactory as an explanatory 
model. He concludes that while the MS model is useful to study emission trading in Germany, particularly as it 
relates to the opening of a policy window, it is best paired with other explanatory approaches.69 While it can be 
argued that the MS model is better used as a complement to other models, other research has shown that for many 
cases, it can be used independently to gain insight into policy choices and processes which leads to public policy 
decision-making and can even subsume other frameworks within its model.70 
In “Strategy of Chinese Policy Entrepreneurs in the Third Sector: Challenges of ‘Technical Infeasibility’” 
Xufeng Zhu (2008) uses the MS model to examine the “Detention and Repatriation” policy for urban vagrants and 
beggars in China, abolished in 2003. Zhu seeks to explain how the policy evolved, and why changes occurred 
when they did. He looks to the “Sun Zhigang Incident” (the death of an individual mistaken for a vagrant) as a 
potential impetus for change in the Detention and Repatriation policy. The author notes the limited research on 
Chinese PEs and uses the MS model to examine this phenomenon, particularly as it compares to Western 	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  Kingdon,	  180	  and	  Michael	  Mintrom	  and	  Sandra	  Vergari,	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  Policy	  Entrepreneurs	  and	  Policy	  Change,”	  Policy	  Studies	  
Journal	  24,	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  1996),	  424.	  
68	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  et	  al.,	  276.	  
69	  Brunner,	  501.	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  For	  instance,	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  al	  demonstrate	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  Canada’s	  International	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applications of the model. Zhu notes that the model is useful in the case of Chinese public policy, but contends that 
the model requires modification.71 The adjustments made by Zhu center primarily on the differences between the 
way that Western governments are organized (on which the MS model is based), and the organizational structure of 
the Chinese political stream.72 
 Another illustration of the MS model is found in the article “Public Sector Sport Policy: Developing a 
Framework for Analysis” (2005). Author Barrie Houlihan views the model as a “powerful critique of rational 
models of decision-making,” as well as a challenge to “the assumption of deeply entrenched institutionalized 
interests that distort the political system.”73  Houlihan notes the absence of analysis of sports policy using the major 
theoretical policy frameworks and models and seeks to shed light on this area by examining sports policy using 
four of the best known policy models: the stages model, the advocacy coalition model, institutional analysis, and 
the MS model.  
 Houlihan’s study ultimately determines that none of the four models examined are entirely adequate to 
explain some of the major issues prevalent in sports, such as drug use, violence, accessibility and other ethical 
issues. Yet he reaches a positive conclusion about Kingdon’s model.  He notes the value in its ability to be used 
alongside other concepts and the emphasis it places on understanding change. Houlihan remarks that there are 
several components of the MS model, such as the role of PE, which are of particular value to the analysis of sports 
policy. He considers the MS model useful in some aspects but points out limitations, suggesting that the model can 
only offer a “partial analysis of stability and change because, while it draws attention to the role of chance and the 
actions of policy entrepreneurs, it does so through a relative myopia towards structural factors and institutionalized 
power.”74 Although the author believes that the MS model is applicable across different policy areas, he argues that 
it is “less easily transferable across political systems” particularly those which are more centralized.75 While this 
determination is an interesting assessment of the model, it is not a factor at play in the context of Canada’s 
decentralized government. 
 There is a final study of the MS model which merits examination, not only because of its unique application 
of Kingdon’s model, but also because its use has telling implications for the case studied in this thesis. Rick Travis’ 
and Nikolaos Zahariadis’ article, “A Multiple Streams Model of U.S. Foreign Aid Policy,” (2002) uses Kingdon’s 
model to quantitatively explain U.S. foreign aid allocations. This work was the first of its kind to apply the MS 
model to foreign policy. The authors note that “Foreign policies are jointly determined by domestic and 
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  Zhu,	  317.	  
72	  Ibid.,	  331.	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  Barrie	  Houlihan,	  “Public	  Sector	  Sports	  Policy:	  Developing	  a	  Framework	  for	  Analysis,”	  International	  Review	  for	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Sport	  





international factors,” something which is evident in the case of Canada’s work on Africa through the G8. 76 The 
authors reason that although there is an obvious connection between the domestic and international, there is “little 
cross-fertilization between the fields of domestic and foreign policy analysis” and they seek to examine this 
interplay.77 They demonstrate how a model designed for analysis of the domestic agenda can be used to understand 
foreign aid allocations and establish the model’s ability to be applied to a variety of policy areas.  
Travis and Zahariadis show how the MS model is a useful mechanism to “organize diverse types of 
information, explore the interactive effects of domestic and external variables, and explain phenomena in domestic 
and foreign policies.”78  They use the MS model in ways which differ from its typical application by applying it to 
foreign policy. This thesis will do the same. However, while Travis and Zahariadis look primarily to budgetary 
matters, this thesis undertakes a wider analysis of foreign policy concerns. Travis and Zahariadis use the model to 
develop a quantitative study of foreign policy outcomes. This is dissimilar to this study, as well as many other 
applications of the MS model, which rely on qualitative analysis. While Kingdon’s model is helpful in 
understanding major policy shifts in agenda setting, Travis and Zahariadis look at “incremental change to existing 
policy.”79 Although the concept of incrementalism is a fascinating adaption of the MS model, useful for some 
cases, especially in the field of budgetary analysis, this thesis declines to use the concept, as the policies enacted in 
Canada and the G8 in the early 2000s represent a major political shift. The yearly meetings of the G8 and the fast-
moving agenda discourage inertia, and in fact, the meetings put pressure on the members to initiate change at a 
relatively rapid rate.  
  Travis and Zahariadis make several modifications to the model in their study. They “extend it to cover 
decision making so that the process of coupling relates to the chances of a policy being adopted rather than merely 
rising to the top of the government’s agenda.”80 This thesis will employ the same change, in order to analyze 
policies which were actually chosen, not only those which rose to the top of the decision making agenda. Travis 
and Zahariadis also do not include the concept of a PE. This study maintains that the PE is an integral component 
of the model. The authors argue that PEs are not as integral in foreign policy as they are in domestic policy and that 
the importance of the actions undertaken by PEs are diminished in foreign policy.  This thesis refutes this claim, 
and demonstrates that a PE was crucial in this case.  Travis and Zahariadis’ study builds upon the MS model by 
using it in a quantitative fashion, extending it to foreign policy decision making.’81  It demonstrates, as does the 
work of Tomlin et al., that the MS model can be used to analyze foreign policy, with little analytical loss and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Travis	  and	  Zahariadis,	  495.	  
77	  Ibid.	  
78	  Ibid.,	  495-­‐496.	  
79	  Ibid.,	  495.	  
80	  Ibid.,	  497.	  The	  authors	  note	  that	  Zahariadis	  (1995,	  1996)	  ‘has	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  that	  this	  extension	  can	  be	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  without	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  of	  analytical	  utility.’	  
See:	  “Selling	  British	  Rail:	  An	  Idea	  Whose	  Time	  Has	  Come?”	  400-­‐422.	  
81	  Ibid.,	  509.	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concludes that, “As globalization takes hold, old divisions between domestic and external affairs become more 
blurred. For political scientists, this has meant renewed attention to breaking down disciplinary barriers….”82 This 
is true for the case of Canada’s work on Africa through the G8. 
 Overall, Zahariadis’ work on the MS model, both in the aforementioned piece, as well as in other forums 
(such as his chapter in Paul A. Sabatier’s Theories of the Policy Process, 1999) is of the utmost importance to 
understanding Kingdon’s ideas about policy.  He levels several criticisms against the model that shed light on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the MS model of public policy making.83 Zahariadis points out that, while relatively 
strong on explanatory power, the MS model has faced criticism for lacking predictive power. He claims that it can 
be a predictive model; however, more quantitative applications of the model must be employed to prove this.84 
Though the author argues that the MS model “resembles more a heuristic device than an empirically falsifiable 
guide to policy analysis,” I believe that it provides an excellent roadmap to analyze the events that lead to a policy 
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  Ibid.,	  510.	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  Zahariadis,	  “Ambiguity,	  Time	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  80.	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  Ibid.,	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85	  Ibid.	  Zahariadis	  cites	  Anthony	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  review	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  “Review	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Chapter Three: Canadian Foreign Aid, G8 and Africa 
3.1 Canada and Official Development Policy 
Jean Chrétien became the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada in June 1990. He was appointed the 
twentieth Prime Minister of Canada on November 4th, 1993, at a time when Canada was facing a major fiscal 
crisis.86 The federal deficit was a governmental priority and under Chrétien, the Liberals introduced significant 
budget cuts. 87  With Paul Martin Jr. as Finance Minister, the government pursued a foreign policy focused on free 
trade, neo-liberalism and continentalization.88 Chrétien’s foreign policy style has been described as “minimalist,” 
largely guided by what has been called “an instrumental view of Canadian foreign policy”.89 While not considered 
a political visionary by his critics, Chrétien’s “iron fist” leadership style was popular with many within the Liberal 
Party of Canada and he was, in many ways, a successful leader.90 
The fiscal crises of the 1990s resulted in many government programs being  drastically cut. Historically, 
when programs are reduced or eliminated due to fiscal problems, development assistance is among the first to be 
targeted, as it “tends to fall at the lower end of the list of Canadian priorities for government spending.”91  Ronald 
Labonte et. al  (2004) explain that “ODA, whether offered directly or as taxpayers’ financial debt relief, is unlike 
almost any other item of government expenditure in that it lacks a domestic political clientele apart from the 
politically favoured beneficiaries to tied aid.”92 It is delivered in the form of grants or loans, either as multilateral 
or bilateral assistance. Bilateral aid goes directly to the receiving nation’s government. Multilateral aid reaches 
other countries through financial institutions and international aid agencies.93 
Canadian ODA spending was relatively low when Chrétien was elected Prime Minister. ODA was largely 
shaped by cabinet and prime-ministerial priorities during the Prime Ministerships of both Brian Mulroney (1984-
1993) and Chrétien (1993-1999). ODA plummeted during the Chrétien years, particularly after funding cuts 
initiated by Martin in the mid-1990s. The decline in aid spending continued through the second half of the 1990s, 	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  Liberalism,	  Party	  Politics	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  A	  paper	  to	  be	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  Steeves,	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  Canadian	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  Policy.”	  in	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  F.	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  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005,	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Michael	  Ignatieff	  had	  described	  Chrétien’s	  government	  as	  “the	  most	  isolationist	  government	  since	  Mackenzie	  King’s	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  all	  
while	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  the	  official	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  that	  internationalism	  is	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  the	  Canadian	  doctrine	  in	  world	  affairs.”	  Ignatieff,	  Michael,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Keating,	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  Africa	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  (Cape	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The	  University	  of	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  Town	  Press),	  133.	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  and	  Megan	  Furi.	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  Developing	  Countries,”	  Political	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  Affairs	  Division,	  Government	  of	  
Canada.	  Available	  online:	  <http://dsp-­‐psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-­‐R/LoPBdP/CIR/7916-­‐e.htm	  May	  2,	  2003.	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  October	  2010).	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when Canadian ODA performance decreased from its 1991 rate of 0.45% to 0.29% by 1998.94 This was 
unfortunate, considering the desire of former Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson (1963-1968) to see ODA reach 0.7 
per cent of the Canadian federal budget. The fall of ODA during this time can be attributed to a variety of causes, 
including fiscal pressures and the implementation of “neo-liberal economic policies in Canada and abroad,” which 
altered the way in which governments viewed their social responsibilities.95  
In 1994, the Liberal government conducted a foreign policy review; its findings were published the 
following year in Canada in the World (1995). ODA was “addressed passively” in the document. It was portrayed 
as a way to promote prosperity and employment, protect Canadian security within a global stable order, and project 
Canadian values and cultures abroad. First and foremost, ODA was characterized as an “investment in prosperity” 
and a way for Canada to move into the markets of the developing world. Rather than concentrating aid or focusing 
on specific issues, Canada’s foreign policy goals were set out in a very general manner. To some, Canada appeared 
to be trying to be “all things to all people.”96 
Canada in the World was reflective of the “values versus interests” debate occurring among Canadians. The 
document carved out a new direction for the Liberal government, as Canada began to seek a larger role 
internationally. This trajectory faced ardent criticism, and the government’s policies were accused of being too 
wide-ranging and not targeted enough.97 The review illustrated an “absence of government leadership on the ‘big 
picture/frame-setting aid issues,’” and proved that “policy innovation in CIDA [the Canadian International 
Development Agency] was at the margins.”98 Chrétien appeared reluctant to allocate funds to foreign policy 
initiatives and to commit Canada to participation in foreign peacekeeping missions, such as in Haiti and Bosnia in 
the 1990s. Tom Keating (2006) points out that this was not indicative of Chrétien’s lack of foreign policy 
influence, but rather  demonstrated that his priorities lay elsewhere. The Prime Minister’s focus rested with matters 
of trade promotion, national and international prosperity, concerns of global poverty and inequities and support of 
international institutions.99 Some critics believed that this new direction came partly as a result of the government 
being uncertain of Canada’s role in a post-Cold War world order, and unclear on what role foreign aid would play 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  “Economic	  and	  Social	  Survey	  of	  Asia	  and	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  Pacific,	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  Poverty	  and	  Development	  Division,	  United	  Nations	  Economic	  and	  Social	  
Commission	  for	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  and	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  2001.	  Available	  online:	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  (3	  
August	  2010),	  237.	  
95	  Tim	  Draimin	  and	  Brian	  Tomlinson,	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  There	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  Future	  for	  Canadian	  Aid	  in	  the	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  Century?”	  in	  Fen	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  and	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  Appel	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  eds.	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  (Toronto:	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  University	  Press,	  1998),	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  Policy	  Post-­‐9/11:	  Institutional	  and	  Other	  Challenges.”	  Prepared	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  Available	  online:	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  Institute,	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within it.100 Moreover, though the Canadian government did acknowledge the need for ODA to be more effective 
in its impact, it was at the same time hindered by a “decline in resources.”101 CIDA was one of the agencies most 
affected by this decline. 
i. Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA): 
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is Canada’s leading development assistance 
agency and administers Canada’s ODA budget. Created in 1968, CIDA works both domestically and abroad to 
initiate development and develop policy.102 Foreign aid was one of the areas most seriously affected by budget cuts 
in the 1990s. CIDA has its budget cut drastically.  Jeffrey Steeves (2007) explains that,  
successive budgets from 1993 to 1998 attacked the annual debt, reducing it from over $40 
billion [Canadian] per annum to a balance by 1999. One of the major victims of the Chrétien 
government’s deficit reduction strategy was foreign aid. Lacking a strong political 
constituency of support following years of trade emphasis, CIDA was an easy and ripe target 
for budget cuts.103 
  
These cuts resulted in a reduction in CIDA programming and in the development assistance countries were 
receiving. Despite the reductions, many nations continued to receive CIDA funding. A substantial percentage of 
Canada’s foreign aid budget went to sub-Saharan Africa, approximately 36% of in 1995-1996.104 Yet this was 
nowhere near what many developing nations required for sustained development and tangible improvements. 
CIDA was facing additional problems during this time. The organization suffered due to rapid turnover in the 
ranks. CIDA personnel, presidents and ministers included, came and went with rapid succession.  For example, 
CIDA President Jocelyne Bourgon lasted only five months in 1993.105 This resulted in confusion and 
organizational chaos.106  
During the years of fiscal austerity, the government “lulled itself into believing that Canada could continue 
to matter internationally while its foreign policy instruments eroded and while the country’s weight relative to 
others...declined.”107 Canada’s approach, which some viewed as lackadaisical, had to change in order for Canada to 
regain its place in the international community. In the second half of the 1990s, as the budgetary situation 
improved, Canada’s foreign policy tactics began to change. African issues gained notice in Canadian foreign aid 
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policy.108  The balanced budget resulted in an infusion of funds to aid programs, including those in Africa. Many 
programs, however, were still only offering small amounts of aid, and ODA was nowhere close to Pearson’s goal 
of 0.7%. Still, Chrétien’s government expressed a desire to see improvements in foreign aid and to enhance their 
involvement in international affairs, particularly in Africa.  Canada demonstrated its renewed interest in foreign aid 
in the February 1997 federal budget, where it provided an increase in funds for ODA, including $50 million for the 
1998-1999 International Assistance Envelope.109 Furthermore, the government appeared interested in mitigating 
African conflicts, for instance, the 1996 refugee crisis in Eastern Zaire. Under Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy 
(1996-2000), Africa dominated many aspects of Canadian foreign policy.110 Axworthy advocated “a new agenda 
around the definition of individual security,” something which would undoubtedly require additional funding. 111 
These matters are discussed further in the second half of this chapter.  
In the early 2000s, CIDA attempted to shape ODA in a manner coherent with emerging norms in the 
international development community, believing that it would be more effective for its partners, and would create 
broader support both at home and internationally. CIDA’s strategy included pursuing targets in poverty reduction, 
improving coordination among donors, and fostering sustainable development.  
Foreign aid did increase in the early 2000s, but was largely tied aid. In 2001, Canada “offered 68% of its 
ODA (excluding technical cooperation and administration costs) on a tied basis.”112 Yet aid was still below the 
levels that some deemed necessary. In an October 2001 Senate Committee meeting, Canada’s former minister John 
Manley discussed the “glaring inadequacy” in foreign aid. Stating that Canada’s current stance was compromising 
its international legitimacy, particularly in multilateral organizations, Manley argued that “You can’t just sit at the 
G8 table and then, when the bill comes, go to the washroom...If you want to play a role in the world, even as a 
small member of the G8, there’s a cost in doing that.”113 The Liberal government acknowledged this, eventually 
making changes in its foreign aid policy; this can be seen through its actions in the G8 summits of 2001 and 2002, 
discussed at length in chapters four and five. 
In 2002, Canada’s ODA program underwent a peer review process by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). In an earlier review (1998), the 
DAC was critical of Canada’s ODA, and raised concerns about its diminishing leadership role in the field of 
international development. The 2002 review noted improvements and observed that Canada’s development 	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cooperation has “strong new wind in its sails.”114 This conclusion came partly as a result of initiatives undertaken 
by CIDA in the early 2000s, which included a renewed focus on poverty reduction and strengthening aid 
effectiveness, with a more targeted focus on fewer countries.115  
Canada’s efforts to improve ODA came partly though its involvement in the G8. Several G8 summits in the 
1990s addressed ODA, which declined in Canada, France, Italy, the US and Germany between 1993 and 2001. 
During this time, Japan’s numbers stayed consistent and the UK saw an improvement.116 The 1999 Cologne 
Summit emphasised increasing the volume of aid, and established the Cologne Debt Initiative to expand debt relief 
to HIPCs. This represented a solid step toward a deeper involvement with development issues. The two subsequent 
summits focused on improving ODA effectiveness, rather than increasing the quantity of aid, to achieve the UN 
target of 0.7% of GDP.117  
3.2 Canada and ODA to Africa 
Historically, Canada’s relationship with Africa has been puzzling, and widely considered to be “peripheral 
to Canada’s national interest.” 118 Canada does not have colonial ties to Africa, nor has it enjoyed a substantial 
contemporary trade relationship with the continent.119 This begs the question, why was Africa central to the 
Canadian agenda around the time of the Genoa and Kananaskis G8 summits, particularly given the aid fatigue of 
the 1990s? This is explored in chapter five, using the Multiple Streams model. Many academics and politicians 
have sought to explain the relationship between Canada and sub-Saharan Africa. Janis van der Westhuizen (2003) 
reflects:  
With narrowly defined national interest considerations, Canada’s extensive and 
intensive relationship with Africa is beyond explanation. Its value based foreign 
policy is based on three historic motivations. First, Canada’s involvement with 
Africa extends the Canadian national identity, with its relatively balanced links with 
both English and French Africa. Second, given its marginal position in the global 
political economy, Africa provided one of very few policy areas where the Canadian 
government can strike out ‘independently’...Third, consistent with its social-
democratic system of government and aid commitments, Canada’s middle power 
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role...is that of ‘helpful fixer’ of emerging problems and inconsistencies within the 
nature of the capitalist world order.120 
 
A result of this limited connection with Africa is that policymakers have a large amount of latitude when it 
comes to policy creation. With relatively few interests in the region, decision-makers are able to shape policies 
with a greater degree of freedom.121 Canada’s engagement with Africa has experienced periods of intensity as well 
as downswings. In the 1990s, African countries suffered greatly due to constraints placed on Canada’s foreign aid 
budget, particularly since many had relied heavily on aid to deliver programs and service. In 1993, CIDA 
announced it was eliminating its conventional bilateral programming in some of the poorest African countries. This 
was reversed when Chrétien’s Liberal government came into power, but CIDA’s 1993-1994 budget still saw a 10% 
cut in spending. The early 1990s were a difficult period for many countries receiving money from CIDA, 
particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1991, the Francophone and Anglophone branches of CIDA merged, 
resulting in changes to African programs. Several countries experienced funding suspensions or cuts in 1993. This 
included Zaire, Kenya, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. CIDA also announced that it was withdrawing entirely from 
Tanzania, previously CIDA’s largest country program, shocking the NGO community.122   
Problems continued into the second half of the 1990s as additional programs were cut and relationships that 
CIDA had built with community-based development groups were severed. Much of the innovative work being 
done between Northern and Southern NGOs were undermined due to lack of funds and changes in policy direction. 
For some countries, cuts to CIDA resulted in real and sustained hardship on the ground. The 1990s represented a 
“serious crisis” period for CIDA.123 
Even with the drastic cuts of the 1990s, Canada maintained close ties to Africa, particularly French West 
Africa. As a “dedicated multilateralist,” Canada stayed engaged partially because of and through involvement with 
multilateral associations such as la Francophonie, the Commonwealth and the United Nations (UN). Chrétien was a 
staunch advocate of working through such organizations, as he was a strong believer in dealing with international 
issues in a multilateral way. “Collective action, whenever possible,” he believed, “[produced] greater long term 
results than unilateral action.”124  
There was an increasing realization that Canada’s aid program required a more “comprehensive, 
programmatic approach that would target aid to clear, defined, strategic priorities where results could be 
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measured.”125 Africa was regaining a place of prominence on the Liberal government’s agenda at the turn of the 
millennium. After the years of cutbacks and austerity, the government was in a better position to pursue a greater 
role in Africa. In 2000, $807 million of Canadian aid (approximately one-third of Canada’s total aid budget) went 
to African countries. This renewed interest in and dedication to Africa was particularly noticeable during Canada’s 
turn as UN Security Council President (2000), where four of the five Canadian-led priorities were directly related 
to Africa.126 In 2000-2001, CIDA disbursed $35 million for basic education in Africa, an increase of $11 million 
from the year before.127 Even so, aid was still widely dispersed. In 2000, Canada “spent at least some aid funds in 
every African country other than Libya.”128 This over-reaching of CIDA programs continued to be a source of 
criticism. Concentrating aid on fewer countries, in a more direct way, became a central focus of Chrétien during 
the Kananaskis summit. 
 African aid and development rose on the Canadian agenda due in large part to Lloyd Axworthy. He created 
the “motive and opportunity for a heightened level of involvement in a series of issues and causes of potential 
importance to Africa, as well as various specifically African human security crises.”129 Axworthy was very much a 
PE during his time in government. Through his dedication to African causes, Canada became a “norm 
entrepreneur,” which led Canada to have an impact on global agenda setting.130  Norm entrepreneurs are 
individuals who attempt to persuade others to see things their way, or to adopt a particular idea or concept. These 
people break away from the established norms, in order to pursue new and innovative policies or solutions.131 
Canada’s involvement in foreign policy around this time was, to a large extend, more in the realm of norm 
entrepreneurship as opposed to on the ground action. 
Axworthy demonstrated that Canada could be a leader in African security and development. As President of 
the UN Security Council (1999-2000), Axworthy was active on all African issues. His accomplishments include 
the “effort to curb the illegal diamond trade that financed rebel groups in Angola and Sierra Leone; the broader 
question of the effectiveness of international sanctions; the re-examination of peacekeeping operations in light of a 
major report on the UN’s failure to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda; and proposed or actual UN 
peacekeeping missions to the Central African Republic, the DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone.”132 He 	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helped to “soften up” the international community on matters of African security.133 He worked to focus the 
Canadian government’s policies on Africa, both domestically and at the G8. This was apparent in many areas, 
including increasing funding to HIV/AIDS programs in Africa by CIDA,134 as well as the government’s cessation 
of debt collection from a total of eleven heavily indebted poor counties, which had demonstrated a commitment to 
reform in January 2001. Many of these countries were in Africa.135 Axworthy’s entrepreneurship indicated that the 
Chrétien government was beginning to establish an increased and sustained commitment to African development, 
and appeared to recognize the potential consequences of inaction. 136  
Axworthy’s entrepreneurship during his period as Foreign Minister is crucial to an understanding of the 
developments and progress made in the realm of Canadian development policy. He led the Liberal government in a 
new direction and laid the groundwork for much of the progress made in the following years. He ‘softened up’ the 
Canadian government to new ideas and policies; this work cannot be overstated. Axworthy’s emphasis on soft 
power, niche diplomacy, and human security became the “defining element of Canadian foreign policy”.137 This 
attention to human security, which was developed and articulated in the Canadian government, served Chrétien 
well at Kananaskis in a post 9/11 world.138 Axworthy’s belief in a different kind of diplomacy, in which NGOs and 
governments could together to create new initiatives (such as the campaign to ban landmines) is evident in the G8’s 
work with NGOs and NEPAD at the summits of 2001 and 2002.139   
3.3 A Brief History of Canada’s Role in the Group of Eight 
The G8 has been described as the “most exclusive club Canada belongs to.”140  It represents one of 
Canada’s most significant and valuable diplomatic assets. Created in 1975, its mandate has changed as 
international circumstances have evolved.  Originally comprised of six countries, the first summit was held in 
Rambouillet, France in 1975, where French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing met with the Presidents of the 
United States and Germany and the Prime Ministers of Italy, Britain and Japan to discuss economic issues. The 
successful event became an annual occurrence, with countries taking turns at hosting. In 1976, Canada joined the 
group, creating the G7. That same year, a representative from the European Community (now known as the 	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European Union, or EU) joined. The EU does not have a turn at the group’s rotating presidency and hosting duties, 
nor is it counted among the group’s official members. The EU does, however, participate in meetings and is 
represented by the country holding the EU Presidency, Commission and Council.141 Russia joined the G8 as a full 
member in 1997, though it had been included in meetings since 1991, when then President Mikhail Gorbachev was 
invited as a guest. In 1998, at Birmingham, United Kingdom (UK) a “leader’s only” format was introduced. This 
format still exists today. Leaders’ personal representatives (“Sherpa’s”) and national ministers meet repeatedly in 
the lead up to the summit.142 Generally, only heads of government attend the summit meetings themselves. These 
closed-door meetings generally focus on several major themes.143  
The G8 has a unique institutional structure. It is a highly decentralized forum; there is no secretariat, nor 
does it have employees. As explained by authors John Kirton and Ella Kokotsis (2002), a condition of the summit’s 
success is its “direct control, from initial design to ultimate delivery, by popularly-elected democratic leaders who 
have personal determination and domestic capital to make the meeting produce real results.”144 Through this 
innovative structure, the G8 handles a variety of issues, crises and concerns.145 
 The G8’s agenda has expanded significantly over the years. Currently, it addresses a range of social, 
political and economic issues. It identifies priority issues, sets policy direction, and establishes principles. The 
main objectives of the G8 have remained the same since its inception:  to bestow political leadership upon the 
international community; to create a system of collective management in which world powers could share 
responsibilities previously exercised primarily by the US; and to “reconcile domestic and international pressure 
generated by growing economic interdependence.”146 As the global situation evolves, the G8 remains a highly 
relevant international body, and is a useful crisis management vehicle—even more so than the UN Security 
Council.147 Although the G8 is an effective international management apparatus, it is not immune from criticism, 
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and has a “double edged reputation.”148 The organizational structure, including its relatively small size can be a 
strength, especially because the members have comparable economic and political systems, but it can also be 
detrimental.149  Some issues are difficult to make progress on, and the G8 can compel only limited changes in the 
international system. Critics have argued that the meetings produce “little more than bland sentiments and scenic 
photo opportunities,” with great amounts of rhetoric, but little in the way of tangible results. Canada sought to 
address this criticism at Kananaskis.150  
Canada has a distinctive role in the G8 forum. At various times, Canada has played the role of supporter, 
mediator and leader, qualities which would be integral to the success at Kananaskis.151 By 2002, Canada had 
hosted five summits and had accomplished a great deal through the group.152 At the 1995 summit in Naples, Italy, 
Chrétien’s government spearheaded the effort to ban landmines. The Prime Minister’s leadership on this issue was 
impressive. In fact, the landmine discussion took place ‘despite the fact that [the Chrétien] government had not 
formally expressed support for a ban’ and Chrétien himself took the initiative to propose the ban.153 This example 
demonstrates the highly personalized leadership that heads of state are able to exercise through G8 summits.  
Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-1984) was the first Canadian Prime Minister to 
attend a G8 meeting as a full member. He worked to ensure that the nation carved out a “niche” in the G8 as a 
champion for the developing world.154 This objective was also promoted by Chrétien during the summits of the 
early 2000s. Chrétien recognized the benefits of conducting foreign policy through the G8 early on. The 
government’s 1995 foreign policy review, Canada in the World, reflected a strong determination to work through 
international organizations. It asserted that Canada could “further its global interests better than any other country 
through its active membership in key international groupings, for example hosting the G-7 summit.”155 On the 
whole, Canada’s performances at G8 summits have been relatively strong and the government has been dedicated 
to complying with its commitments.156 Although Canada was restricted due to budget constraints, it still 
championed African issues at the G8 in the 1990s, particularly at the 1996 and 1997 summit meetings (in Lyon, 	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France and Denver, Colorado, respectively).157 Canada did not promise a great deal of aid at this time, but it did try 
to keep African development on the G8 agenda. 
 Canada had a distinct advantage in the G8 during Chrétien’s leadership, because he was the most 
experienced of its leaders. He was accustomed to the format of multilateral meetings, including La Francophonie, 
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Commonwealth, and Summit of the America leaders. This 
familiarity with operating within multilateral organizations and with building connections, trust and compromise 
served Chrétien well as he hosted the G8 meeting in 2002. Chrétien’s experience in attending such meetings 
extended back to 1978 when he attended his first G7 summit as Canada’s Finance Minister.158 This experience 
would prove to be a valuable asset. 
3.4 The G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy, July 2001 
 The turn of the millennium ushered in changes in the relationship between the G8 and African countries.  
At the 2000 summit in Okinawa, Japan laid much of the groundwork for the G8’s increasing involvement in 
Africa. In the summit’s closing communiqué, leaders stated that the G8 must “engage in new partnerships with 
non-G8 countries, particularly developing countries, international organizations and civil society.”159 Influenced by 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the G8 renewed its commitment to work with developing countries 
to support development.  
The Genoa summit was proposed by President Giuliano Amato (1992-1993, 2000-2001) and hosted by 
incoming President Silvio Berlusconi, July 20th to 22nd, 2001. The summit focused on world poverty and 
globalization. It addressed many pressing issues and represented a notable increase in the attention paid to 
international aid and development. Like Okinawa before it, Genoa made significant headway in reaching out to 
developing nations for input, participation and action. It “pioneered outreach by the G8 to both non-G8 countries 
and to business firms and civil society.”160 In hopes of building on the work of Genoa at Kananaskis, Chrétien and 
his Canadian representatives worked closely with the Italian delegation to devise a “multiyear emphasis and 
cadence” that Canada could sustain as it hosted in 2002. The Canadian contingent helped to keep the agenda 
focused on Africa, both by supporting the development initiatives created at Genoa, and by working with G8 
nations to create cohesion between summits, in hopes that the decisions reached at Genoa would be built upon and 
carried through into 2002.161  
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The Genoa summit was successful in several regards.  The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria was created. This fund created partnerships between governments, civil society, communities and the 
private sector to develop financial resources to battle these deadly diseases.162 The summit also worked to bridge 
the digital divide between nations, and addressed environmental sustainability. During the summit, leaders 
committed to the OECD-DAC recommendation to untie aid to Less Developed Countries (LDCs) (except for 
investment-related technical cooperation and food aid). Canada surpassed this commitment by untying technical 
cooperation to all African nations and LDCs.163 Progress was made on African issues as well, discussed in detail 
below. 
Although progress was made at Genoa, the summit faced a great deal of criticism, perhaps more than any 
before it. It was denounced for being too large. Over 2000 people attended, including heads of states, Sherpas, 
ministers and aids.164 It attracted a huge number of protesters and while most of the estimated 300,000 
demonstrators were peaceful, some came to blows with Italian police, resulting in fierce clashes.  The reasons for 
the protests were varied: some groups did not believe that eight nations possessed the right to dictate rules for the 
international community. Others believed that the G8s work with LDCs had been inadequate and required more. 
Others still protested for environmental reasons.165 The protests, replete with violence and injury, became the focus 
of the summit. Genoa made front page news around the world, when a protester was killed during a clash with 
police officers on the opening day.166  
Despite the violence, Genoa produced a number of lasting initiatives. Along with the aforementioned 
Global Fund, Genoa produced a forum for the creators of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) 
to present their innovative program for Africa. By creating a partnership between NEPAD and the G8, the G8 
embarked on a highly inventive campaign, combining political and economic elements to build a holistic plan for 
the renewal of African nations.  
i. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) 
NEPAD (originally called the “New African Initiative” or “NAI”) was a strategic document created by 
Africans for Africans, designed to generate a renewal of African progress. In 2000, President Thabo Mbeki of 
South Africa, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria were 
approached by the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and asked to create a strategy to address Africa’s 	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monstrous debt crisis.167 Several plans were created, including the “Millennium Partnership for Africa’s Recovery 
Programme” ( MAP), introduced by Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflicka, and the “Omega Plan” by President Wade 
of Senegal. Ideas from the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) (created by Secretary General K.Y. 
Amoako of Ghana) and the “Compact for African Recovery,” (designed to ‘provide technical and analytical 
support to MAP’) were also included.168 NEPAD was endorsed by fifty-three members of the OAU in July 2001.169 
Described as a “massive, bold and ambitious project aimed at both the enhancement of governance 
practices and the economic reconstruction and development of the continent,” NEPAD had several objectives 
including: the eradication of poverty, the acceleration of the empowerment of women, the encouragement of 
sustainable growth and development among African nations, and the integration of African nations into the 
globalization process.170 The plan’s goals were extremely formidable, and included: achieving growth rates of 7% 
per year, and cutting the percentage of people living in poverty in half by the year 2015.171 For many, NEPAD 
represented a path out of corruption, towards good governance and greater African involvement in the world 
economy.  
NEPAD proposed a “home-grown” solution to Africa’s development challenges. It was very much “made 
in (and for) Genoa and Kananaskis.”172 Steven Langdon (2003) described the plan as “a tough-minded bargain that 
meeting financial and governance standards can achieve higher sustained aid to a number of well-performing 
countries,” and “a vision aiming to rekindle a sense of hopefulness.”173 Emphasizing partnership, NEPAD sought 
to avoid placing blaming the West for Africa’s development struggles. Instead, it looked towards new solutions to 
increase prosperity. NEPAD focused on good governance, and aimed to achieve an “African Renaissance,” which 
would ultimately lead to a 21st century in which Africa would be a strong presence.174 The local ownership aspect 
of NEPAD was seen as vital, both by the creators of NEPAD and to the G8 leaders who supported the plan. The 
plan contained a peer-review mechanism through which to evaluate country performance. 
Just prior to the Okinawa summit, African Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika elected to approach 
Western nations through the G8.  At Genoa, these African leaders were invited to an outreach dinner, along with 
President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and President Alpha Oumar Konaré of Mali, at which they presented 
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NEPAD to the G8.175  The G8 decided to provide funds and other supports to aid NEPAD goals, though these plans 
were not developed until after the Genoa meetings. 
NEPAD faced criticism. It was accused of lacking legitimacy and failing to recognize the diversity of the 
African people. The North-South Institute claimed that NEPAD did not “have the support of the people, who 
remain almost entirely ignorant about it...”176 These criticisms were refuted by leaders and supports of the plan 
alike, who noted that NEPAD was designed as a program designed by Africans for Africans. Yet the criticisms that 
the process lacked in public consolations and had failed to earn the support of the wider public were troubling.177 
Still, Chrétien predicted that if fully implemented, NEPAD could “transform the relationship of Africans with each 
other and with the world.”178 
ii. Response to NEPAD by the G8: 
The G8 released a statement on July 21st, 2001 announcing that its leaders supported NEPAD and believed 
that the initiative provided “the basis for a new intensive partnership between Africa and the developing world.”  
The leaders reported that they would support the program’s key themes, among them poverty and conflict 
reduction, democratic reforms, good governance and the stimulation of the economy.  
 The G8’s formal response to NEPAD was the Genoa Plan for Africa (later renamed the African Action 
Plan, or AAP.) It did not commit to specific programs or targets, but it appointed a representative from each nation 
to “liase [sic] with committed African Leaders on the development of a concrete Action Plan to be approved at the 
G8 Summit next year under the leadership of Canada.”179 These representatives would act under the guidance of 
Canada to create a plan to support NEPAD and would work with the NEPAD Implementation Committee to 
address what the plan would look like.180 This role was defined by Chrétien, and the individuals charged with the 
task were called “African Personal Representatives” (APRs).  Kirton calls Canada a ‘G-7-8 system builder’ for 
creating this position.181 The AAP was very much the mechanism that placed African issues on the agenda for the 
G8. It was because of Chrétien’s dedication to facilitating the process that the AAP remained a central agenda item 
for the group. 	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 The African Personal Representatives were crucial to the creation of the AAP. The Canadian ARP was also 
Canada’s Sherpa, Robert Fowler. Fowler had a great deal of experience, which made him well suited for these dual 
roles. He was former governmental policy advisor, ambassador to the UN, assistant deputy minister at the 
Department of National Defense, and diplomat. He was familiar with the summit process, as he had already served 
as Sherpa at two prior summits. Fowler’s responsibilities as Sherpa included “arranging the agenda, documents, 
accommodations, security, and declarations” for the summit, and acting as the personal envoy of the Prime 
Minister.182 The high-ranking diplomat was “deeply convinced of the seriousness of the African vision” and 
worked tirelessly to ensure that that the NEPAD was promoted at the G8 and around the international 
community.183 Fowler was the logical choice to guide the 2002 agenda, which so greatly emphasized Africa. He 
had ample experience on the continent. He had taught in Rwanda, represented Canada on the UN Security Council 
(1999-2000), and chaired the UN Security Council’s Angola Sanctions Committee (2002). Fowler and the other 
APRs met several times leading up to Kananaskis, and engaged with members of the NEPAD Steering Group, the 
NEPAD Heads of State Implementation Committee, and members of civil society. They built on the Genoa Plan 
for Africa to create a cohesive plan to work with Africa.184 The APR’s also conducted domestic consultations with 
their respective constituents. 185  
   Canada was charged with leading the G8’s response. It was also among the most engaged country in the 
NEPAD process. In fact, Van der Westhuizen described Canada as an “interlocutor” in his 2003 analysis of the 
NEPAD plan.186 He asserted that Canada helped reconcile the principles of NEPAD to Canadians and to its G8 
partners, which assisted NEPAD "fit within existing dominant belief systems and social structures of both African 
and G8 states.”187 It also gave Canada an opportunity to play a prominent leadership role in the G8, and to act as 
norm builder and policy promoter locally and internationally. Steeves (2007) points out that this was fortuitous 
timing, because the “basket of values articulated by CIDA and Foreign Affairs [was] mirrored in...the NEPAD 
proposal.”188 This joining of values was well timed for Canada’s foreign aid program. 
 Chrétien’s decision to make NEPAD a priority was an important moment for Canada and the G8. Fowler 
reports: “In a late-night meeting at the conclusion of the first day of the 2001 summit, Jean Chrétien insisted that 
G-8 leaders respond to the African initiative firmly and forcefully, and proposed—for the first time in the 28 years 	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of Summit history—that a new group of personal representatives be established to address a single issue, in this 
case, to draw up an “African Action Plan” in response to the NEPAD proposal.”189 And so began the Canadian 
Prime Minister’s leadership on this issue through the G8. The adoption of the AAP at Genoa placed Africa on the 
G8’s agenda, and it was up to Chrétien to harness and facilitate the opportunity for change. 
Chrétien’s insistence on personalized and direct attention on formulating an appropriate response to 
development aid was indicative of his eagerness to see African development as both a Canadian and G8 priority. 
The AAP demonstrated the willingness of the G8 to work closely with Africa to encourage sustainable change. The 
NEPAD proposal represented an opportunity for the G8 to be portrayed in a new and more altruistic light. For 
Canada, it was a way to bolster its ODA program and to “refurbish” its identity as a nation which designed its 
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Chapter Four: The G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, June 2002 
4.1 Canada’s Africa Policy –Genoa to Kananaskis 
Support for the AAP grew after the Genoa summit. In an unprecedented move, Italian President Berlusconi 
invited Prime Minister Chrétien to take over as G8 chair immediately after Genoa, though he was not slated to take 
the position until January 2002. In his 2007 memoirs, Chrétien recalled that the “other leaders asked me to pick up 
the file right away....The request was an honour and a surprise.” In preparation for the Kananaskis summit, 
Chrétien took two important initiatives to advance Canada’s relationship with Africa: in December 2001 he 
announced the Canada Fund for Africa (hereafter known as the Canada Fund) and at the International Conference 
on Financing on Development (hereafter known as the Monterrey Conference) he declared that he would be 
doubling Canada’s overseas development assistance by 2010, with at least half earmarked for Africa.   
i. The Canada Fund for Africa  
In 2002, Chrétien made a personal commitment “not to forget Africa.” At the same time, CIDA stated that 
Africa was to be “at the center of Canada’s cooperation agenda.”191  The Chrétien government acknowledged that 
improving development in Africa would be a monumental task, and it worked to improve Canada’s contribution 
while encouraging other G8 nations to do so as well. In the December 2001 federal budget, the Canada Fund for 
Africa was announced. The money for this $500 million fund was to come from federal budget surpluses over the 
next three years.192 Canada was the first G8 nation to create funding to support NEPAD and the African Action 
Plan (AAP), and in doing so, took a clear leadership role on the issue.193  
  The Canada Fund was created to support initiatives that contributed to sustainable development in Africa. 
Stressing African leadership and ownership, the Canada Fund focused on governance, peace, security, trade, 
investment, health, environment, and digital issues.194 It committed $50 million to vaccine research and 
development.195 It allotted $100 million to the Canada Investment Fund for Africa which was to be cofounded 
with, and managed by, private sector investors and focus on transport, infrastructure, water and sanitation 
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projects.196 $9 million was devoted to Parliamentary strengthening,197 $35 million to “bridging the digital divide,” 
$130 to trade and investment, $6 million to local governance, and $28 million to public sector capacity building.198 
There was also $50 million dedicated to sanitation and water projects through the “Global Water Partnership”, $18 
million to “strengthening governance and civil society engagement”199, and $20 million put towards building 
capacity for export growth.200  
Aligned with the principles articulated in the MDGs and the goals of CIDA, the Canada Fund supported 
African ownership while reflecting Canadian priorities. It demonstrated that Canada was dedicated in its 
engagement with African development and was prepared to lead by example. The Canada Fund was an important 
development in Canada’s aid strategy. Yet the critics found its focus on private investment troublesome, as this had 
the potential to lead to high prices and limited access for the poorest of the poor people in Africa. Others contended 
that the Canada Fund fell short of the amount required to produce sustained change. Still, the Canada Fund 
represented an opportunity for Canada to set the stage for increased development assistance at Kananaskis, as did 
the promises made at the Monterrey Conference. 
 
 
ii. The Monterrey Conference 
           At the March 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, New 
Mexico, Prime Minister Chrétien once again signalled his intent to make foreign aid a national priority. The 
conference, designed to find ways to stimulate developing countries involvement with the global economy, was 
attended by over fifty heads of government. Topics included “coherence in domestic resources, the role of foreign 
direct investment, the impact of international trade on development, official development assistance and debt relief 
and international financial systems.”201  The conference aimed to foster the sharing of ideas among stakeholders, 
which included civil society, business groups, institutional partners and governments. The meeting produced the 	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Monterrey Consensus. This unanimously accepted document represented a “landmark framework for global 
development partnership in which the developed and developing countries agreed take joint actions for poverty 
reduction.”202 An encouraging international commitment, the document demonstrated the international consensus 
that the MDGs were the preferred way through which to achieve development.203 Though not a joint commitment, 
the Monterrey Consensus had important consequences for the G8 organization and its partnership with Africa, as 
this was the venue through which many promises for the AAP were made.204 Chrétien called it “unprecedented in 
scope and participation...[it] seeks to take an indispensable step forward together in securing a fundamental 
common cause of the United Nations. Canada is especially pleased that the consensus acknowledges the 
complexity of the issues at hand. It resists the temptation to resort to attractive but simplistic solutions.”205  
During the conference, Chrétien announced Canada’s commitment to boost its foreign aid by eight per cent 
per year, resulting in a doubling of Canadian ODA by 2010.206 Chrétien later explained this decision: “At the 
Monterrey meeting, much to the surprise of my finance minister, who happened to be sitting next to me at the time, 
I unexpectedly announced that Canada was going to double our overseas development assistance by 2010, with at 
least half earmarked for Africa.”207 This statement constitutes evidence of Chrétien’s role as a policy entrepreneur 
in the early 2000s, creating an impetus for change in Canada’s relationship with Africa. This leadership was highly 
personalized, as Chrétien worked to create policies that he believed to be important.  
Chrétien later observed: “Not only did [the Canadian commitment made at Monterrey] serve as a spur to 
the other G8 members but it demonstrated my personal hope that we as a nation [would] reach Pearson’s goal [of 
0.7 per cent of GDP] someday soon.”208  He went on to voice his regret that the first budget he oversaw as Prime 
Minister reduced foreign aid by thirty percent, but he argued that, “the federal government was virtually bankrupt 
and we had to treat all departments equally.”209 At Monterrey, Chrétien argued that dealing with the debts of 
developing nations would continue to be a priority for Canada, and that “As chair of the G8, Canada has made 
building a development partnership with Africa a priority, with an approach that reflects and seeks to advance the 	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Monterrey Consensus.”210 Chrétien’s actions at Monterrey placed him in the position of PE for the G8 on the 
subject of Africa. 
Other important developments occurred around this time, providing further evidence of Canada’s new 
emphasis on African aid and development as priorities. On January 1, 2001, the Chrétien government announced 
an immediate moratorium on the collection of debt payments from eleven Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). 
Many of the countries were African, such as Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan and Tanzania.211 In Chrétien’s 2001 address 
in reply to the Speech from the Throne, he signalled his intent to focus more on international assistance. He stated 
that “We will increase our international development assistance, to expand opportunities for more countries to 
participate in the benefits of globalization, while promoting peace and human security in the world.”212Chrétien’s 
commitments reversed a steep decline in ODA funding in recent years, and reflected the efforts he was making to 
lead African development. In the 2002 Throne Speech, Governor General Adrienne Clarkson addressed support for 
Africa. She highlighted some of Canada’s recent development commitments, declaring that: “We will double our 
development assistance by the year 2010, and earmark at least half of that increase for Africa as part of Canada's 
support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development. As of January 1, 2003, Canada will eliminate tariffs and 
quotas on almost all products from the least-developed countries.”213 Prime Minister Chrétien’s response to the 
Throne Speech announced some of his recent initiatives, and detailed his government’s plans for Canadian 
development assistance, better trade options for LDCs, and a greater focus on African development.214  
In its 2002 foreign policy statement, Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on 
Strengthening Aid Effectiveness, CIDA highlighted the importance of social development, something it also did in 
the 1995 review. CIDA had long been criticized for its lack of focus, but the 2002 statement announced a move 
towards aid programs with more focused sectors and recipients. CIDA also noted a plan for closer coordination 
with the “priorities and practices” of the donor community as a whole. 215   CIDA committed to double its 
investment in social development over the next five years and outlined four specific targets which would be 
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emphasized from 2002 to 2005: child protection, health and nutrition, basic education and HIV/AIDS.216  The 
document focused on African nations and emphasised Canada’s resolve to support the MDGs.  
In preparation for the Africa-focused G8 summit hosted by Chrétien, the Prime Minister travelled to Africa 
in April 2002. He met with members of the UN, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie and members of NEPAD to 
“build and maintain a consensus with regard to the G8’s African Action Plan...”217 The trip demonstrated 
Chrétien’s personal commitment to improving development efforts in Africa. In conjunction with the Canada Fund 
for Africa and the commitment made at Monterrey, it also marked the beginning of Chrétien’s entrepreneurship, as 
he sought to set an example for other members of the G8 and, arguably, craft a lasting political legacy for himself. 
Chrétien worked to generate political will, both at home and abroad. While in Africa, Chrétien traveled to 
Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia and South Africa, and met with fourteen African leaders, 
some of whom were involved in the creation and implementation of NEPAD, and consulted with them on the 
African Action Plan.218 Meeting with these leaders was especially important because the Presidents of Algeria, 
Nigeria and Senegal would all be attending Kananaskis to partake in the discussions around the AAP.  They were 
coming at the invitation of the Canadian Prime Minister. This invitation was indicative of Chrétien’s commitment 
to a collaborative G8 partnership with Africa.  
During an April 2002 speech in Ethiopia, Chrétien touted some of the progress made by Canada on 
development issues. Speeches such as these demonstrated to the world the progress which Canada had made in 
recent years. He stated that, 
Much of our foreign policy in recent years has been focused on issues of special 
concern to Africa...We have forgiven all the development assistance debt of almost 
all Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, including $1.3 billion for the thirty four least 
developed countries in Africa. We have forgiven over forty two billion in other debt 
payments owing to the Government of Canada. And on January 1st, 2001, we also 
stopped collecting interest owing on the remaining debt from eight African HIPCs 
who have committed to reform.219 
 
The Canadian government set the stage for an Africa-focused G8 summit in 2002. As the summit approached, 
Kirton predicted that, “With [his] international experience and domestic political strength, Jean Chrétien [is] in a 
strong position to make Kananaskis a major success, should [he] display the energy, flexibility, and vision required 
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for global governance in the new twenty-first-century world.”220 Under the Prime Minister’s leadership, Canada 
was prepared to lead at Kananaskis. Canada was able to portray itself as compliant with past G8 targets; it ranked 
number one among the G8 in its compliance to the Genoa priorities (82%). This was commendable, though the 
lagging compliance of the US and Japan (35% and 44%, respectively) was cause for concern about the lasting 
success of any progress made at Kananaskis.221 Ultimately, though optimism about the summit 2002 existed, 
scepticism remained.  There were doubts regarding the interest of the G8’s domestic constituencies in the agenda 
priorities. This was especially true in Canada, where concern for Africa continued to rank low among foreign 
policy concerns among citizens.222 It remained to be seen whether the final product at Kananaskis would be 
rhetoric or real, quantifiable action to aid African nations climb out of poverty. 
4.2 The G8 Summit in Kananaskis, June 26-27, 2002 
At the 2001 summit in Genoa, Italy confirmed what many observers of international aid policy had been 
speculating—that the new millennium would bring with it reform and renewal in how countries viewed aid. 
Increasingly, African development was becoming an international concern.223 Because of the high degree of 
cohesiveness within the G8 at the time, the African aid agenda transferred well from Genoa to Kananaskis. The 
2002 Summit presented an excellent opportunity for Canada to provide the international community with a “made-
in-Canada” achievement, something which had not occurred on such a large scale in recent years.224 Although the 
issue of African development was on the G8 agenda prior to Chrétien’s turn as host chair, he was able to act as a 
facilitator and policy entrepreneur of specific issues at Kananaskis, driving them forward and working to ensure 
their success.  
With the world watching, and facing intense domestic and inner-party pressure, Chrétien was determined to 
make the Kananaskis Summit different from those of the past. It was to be a meeting with deliverable results, 
benefiting not only G8 members, but also developing nations. After the violence of Genoa, Kananaskis aimed to 
present a more positive image. Hopes were high for the 2002 summit, particularly because the Genoa commitments 
had been largely kept.225  The compliance rate post-Genoa was on average 50%, which exceeded the compliance 
rate from the five summits before it. Kirton and Kokotsis (2000) predicted that, “Led by the vast Summit 
experience of this year’s host...[the G8] leaders should have the political commitment and capital to transcend the 
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quite different concerns of their publics and thus make Kananaskis, on its centrepiece themes, a major success.”226 
To properly benefit from the favourable conditions of the summit, Chrétien had to make use of the capacities of the 
G8 leaders to agree on a sustainable African policy. His leadership was conducive to the G8 achieving its Africa 
goals, as Chrétien was “the man most likely to close the deal.”227  
i. Canada Hosts the Summit 
 In the summer of 2002, Chrétien was preoccupied with G8 Summit preparations, and with convincing other 
G8 nations to adopt the AAP and ensure that the threat of terrorism did not eclipse Africa as the focus of the 
summit. Chrétien also had to contend with a growing domestic political crisis, as he wrestled with issues in his own 
party. Paul Martin, a Member of Parliament since 1998 (and Chrétien’s opponent in the 1990 leadership race), was 
making a bid for the Prime Ministership. Martin and Chrétien had never enjoyed a warm relationship. Tensions 
between the two had existed from the late 1990s right up to the present.228  These tensions played out in the media 
and within the Liberal party itself.  Martin’s camp was unsure as to whether Chrétien would try to remain leader of 
the party, or relinquish his power post-Kananaskis. For his part, Chrétien appeared to recognise Martin was 
“working hard” to gather support, but seemed to be unconcerned by the threat. He did not “go out of his way” to 
either “help [Martin] or to hurt him.”229 
 Hostilities continued into the spring of 2000. One week prior to the March biennial Liberal convention, 
several MPs met, with the alleged purpose discussing how to prevent Chrétien running for leader of the party once 
again.230  The Prime Minister reported being hurt by the “betrayal” of Martin, stating: “I felt he owed me, at the 
very least, the decency of letting me retire on my own terms and some respect for the Liberal tradition—one of our 
greatest strengths—of supporting the leader.”231  Soon after this meeting, Chrétien announced his intention to run 
once more, claiming that his motives for wanting another opportunity as Prime Minister came not from wanting to 
“cling to power, beat Wilfrid Laurier’s record in office, or deny Paul Martin his dream.” Rather, his reasons for 
staying came from a love of the job and a desire to see the Liberal agenda he created completed. He later recalled, 
“I was damned if I was going to let myself be shoved out the door by a gang of self-serving goons.”232 
 As summer 2002 approached, there was still strain within the Liberal Party, as speculation grew that 
Martin’s time as Finance Minister would soon be over. In early June 2002, Chrétien “accepted [Martin’s] 
resignation.”233 Martin claimed he was fired. This event resulted in an increasingly contentious environment, with 	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battle lines being drawn within the Liberal party. The calls for Chrétien’s retirement, along with the sacking of 
Martin just days before the Kananaskis summit, forced the Prime Minister to consider his next political move, and 
to contemplate the prospect of competing for the party leadership once again.234 It also raised questions about 
shaping a political legacy. Kananaskis had the potential to be the ideal venue for legacy-making, should Chrétien 
choose to take the opportunity. Politically wounded from his battle with Martin and others in his party, Chrétien 
shifted his attention to the Kananaskis summit and to developing the AAP policy, through which he contended that 
a real change for Africa could occur.235 
One of the major challenges Chrétien faced before Kananaskis was to bridge the political divide between 
US President Bush, France’s President Chirac and those on the political left. This would require Chrétien to be a 
skilled political entrepreneur, building agreement and consensus in areas where little existed. In addition to these 
ideological and strategic chasms, Chrétien had to contend with domestic turmoil, the anti-globalization forces ever-
present at G8 functions, and the challenge of focusing the agenda on Africa so shortly after the terrorist attacks of 
9/11. He also faced the glare of the media spotlight. The world was watching to see if he would succeed in the most 
“ambitious policy proposal of his nine years as Canada’s leader.”236 Still, summit-watchers were highly optimistic 
about Kananaskis and the work that Canada could achieve through the G8.237 
Kananaskis was a departure from past summits in several regards. G8 summits had been criticized for being 
little more than a political photo-op and an exercise in pomp and rhetoric.  In light of the violence of Genoa and a 
rise of other criticisms, Chrétien chose to host a “back to basics” summit. He scaled the summit back, reduced the 
delegation size, and took steps to foster a more informal atmosphere.238 He moved the meeting from its original 
location of Ottawa, Ontario, to Kananaskis, Alberta.  This change in venue provided leaders with a more isolated, 
intimate setting, while also decreasing the likelihood of protesters travelling to the relatively remote location. The 
Genoa summit was lambasted for failing to adequately engage the public and for restricting the involvement of 
non-G8 nations at the event; these were things that Kananaskis sought to remedy.239 
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Approximately four hundred officials attended the summit, but only heads of government were present for 
the discussions.240 Chrétien was determined to keep the focus on the agenda and to reduce outside distractions as 
much as possible. News media and the majority of civil society organizations were based in Calgary, over ninety 
kilometres from Kananaskis. In another innovation, Chrétien summarized the summit in a three-page document, 
dubbed the “Chairman’s Statement.” It was prepared at the conclusion of the summit, and cut down on the massive 
amounts of paperwork typically produced.241  The summit was reduced from its usual three-days to just two. This 
decision resulted in a number of Canadians asking why Canada was bothering with the summit at all; especially 
when a rumour surfaced that US President George Bush would attend for less than twenty four hours.242 Chrétien 
was emphatic that the meetings proceed, even as high profile individuals, including Alberta Premier Ralph Klein, 
suggested the summit be postponed, or even cancelled altogether.243 Chrétien wanted to prove that Canada was a 
foremost power among the G8, capable of hosting a successful summit and ushering in political change. He was 
determined to steer a meeting with an ambitious agenda, to create targeted goals.244 
Taking place ten months after the 9/11 attacks, the threat of terrorism had a serious impact on the 
Kananaskis summit. Canada was the only G8 member to not experience a terrorist attack on its soil. Safety was of 
paramount concern at Kananaskis, and an estimated $300 million spent on ensuring that security was adequately 
addressed.245  9/11 also had an impact on the summit’s agenda. The G8 foreign minister’s meeting, traditionally 
held on September 30th, was postponed. Rescheduled for November 11th, 2001, its agenda was entirely committed 
to addressing terrorism and instability in the Middle East. Despite the obvious need to alter the agenda to 
incorporate terrorism and global security, Chrétien was determined to keep the focus on African development and 
not allow terrorism to eclipse the policy proposals he had so strongly forwarded and supported. As Canada 
assumed its role as summit host, the government worked to “shape the event in its preferred image.” Chrétien 
“struggled to deliver a small, informal, private summit focused on reducing poverty in Africa.”246 With the 
immense influence of the US on the G8 and on world politics more generally, Chrétien could easily have bowed to 
pressure to change the agenda to focus on terrorism instead of development. Instead, he focused on Africa and 
NEPAD, “even though [the Canadian government] knew that the Americans weren’t comfortable with the 
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subject.”247 He behaved as policy entrepreneur, and managed to create room on the governmental agenda for both 
global security and development.  
The Kananaskis summit was met with other challenges as well. In addition to dealing with the pressure to 
make terrorism the centerpiece of the summit, Chrétien had to ensure that he could convince the G8 and the 
African leaders responsible for NEPAD to agree to an overarching policy arrangement, and to put in place the 
mechanisms and funding to ensure that this new partnership would be a success. Some summit watchers speculated 
that Chrétien would support the US position on Africa rather than take a stand of his own.248 Others predicted that 
he would show a general disinterest in aid. This assumption was based on the “relative decline in defence and 
foreign affairs spending during Chrétien’s period” reflecting his “lack of interest beyond domestic politics.”249 
Many questioned why Chrétien chose Africa as a central concern, asking whether the G8 was the correct forum for 
action, especially with the pressing threat of terrorism. One scholar referred to Chrétien’s newfound focus on 
Africa as “typical of his flavour-of-the-day approach to foreign policy.”250 Another observed that Chrétien’s 
foreign policy legacy would be quite minimal altogether.251 Though some believed that Chrétien’s convictions on 
Africa were genuine, lingering doubts remained as to whether the G8 could produce real results, especially with 
Chrétien at the helm.  
The view that Chrétien‘s sudden interest in Africa was the result of a legacy bid was not universal. 
Christopher Sands, director of the Canada Project at Washington’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
postulated that there was “real conviction” behind the Prime Minister’s motives, possibly as a result of Chrétien’s 
“traditional sympathy for the underdog.” However, Sands concluded that, “it’s hard to see much there on which he 
can develop a legacy.”252 Chrétien could have very well been acting on his own motivations, as he had expressed 
dismay in cutting ODA during the 1990s, and regret for reducing foreign aid by thirty percent in the first budget 
under his leadership.253  
In discussing the likelihood of success at Kananaskis, Gordon Smith (2002) reported that there was a 
“reasonable consistency between what African leaders want and what the G8 is prepared to do, at least at the level 
of words.”254  The events of 9/11, and the connection made between terrorism, underdevelopment and poverty, 	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created the pressure to enact new mechanisms to substantially deal with these issues.255 Overall, the outlook was 
optimistic, and as the meeting approached, conditions were favourable for achieving success on the African 
agenda. 
ii. Overview of the Summit 
The Kananaskis summit had one of the most formidable agendas in G8 history, focusing on several major 
themes. Only three general issues were addressed in detail at the summit itself; others were relegated to pre-summit 
meetings. Historically, a small summit agenda has been shown to be conducive to its overall success.256 The 
Canadian contingent promoted their priorities for Kananaskis early on. Fowler proposed an agenda to the G8 
Sherpa’s at their first meeting in December 2001.  He highlighted three priority challenges: “Strengthening world 
economic growth, building a new partnership for African development and combating terrorism.”257 The agenda 
was agreed on at this time and did not change.258  At Kananaskis, Prime Minister Chrétien devoted a full day of 
discussion to development in Africa and the G8’s response to NEPAD. Canada’s leadership on Africa was 
supported by other nations, including its “summit soulmates” Italy, Japan and France.259 Terrorism was a pertinent 
issue, and by making a link between lagging international development and terrorism, advocates of the AAP were 
able to keep Africa as the centre issue at the summit. The G8 chose to highlight the roots of terrorism, reasoning 
that terrorism was often bred through underdevelopment, poverty and desperation. Making this connection allowed 
the Canadian hosts to “choose an agenda that not only [matched] the new demands of the fight against terrorism 
but also provided continuity with earlier summit decisions, especially from Genoa 2001, and maintained the G8’s 
focus on responding to globalisation.”260  It was acknowledged that fighting poverty and fostering stronger 
democracies were inherently important to stopping terrorism. The linkage made in this respect gave Canada a 
unique chance to forge ahead with its development agenda while still keeping global security at the forefront.261 
Education was also on the agenda, and a previously convened G8 task force produced a report emphasizing 
the need for all children to be in school, especially girls. Sustainable development was addressed, and was 
incorporated into the African Action Plan. Health was discussed, though no substantial progress was made on the 
G8’s Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The unwillingness of the G8 to follow up on this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255	  Sylvia	  Ostry,	  "Globalization	  and	  the	  G8:	  Could	  Kananaskis	  Set	  a	  New	  Direction?"	  O.D.	  Skelton	  Memorial	  Lecture,	  Queen's	  University.	  
University	  of	  Toronto.	  March	  2002,	  5.	  Available	  online:	  <http://www.utoronto.ca/cis/skeltonlecture_ostry2002.doc>	  (10	  June	  2010).	  
256	  Gerald	  Helleiner,	  “Round	  Table:	  Canada’s	  Kananaskis	  G8	  Summit:	  What	  Can	  and	  Should	  be	  Done?”	  First	  Round	  Table	  Discussion.	  G8	  
Research	  Group.	  Available	  online:	  <www.tpsace.library.utoronto.ca>,	  7.	  (10	  June	  2011).	  
257	  Fowler,	  225.	  
258	  Ibid.	  
259	  Kirton,	  “Canada	  as	  a	  Principal	  Summit	  Power:	  G-­‐7/9	  Concert	  Diplomacy	  from	  Halifax	  1995	  to	  	  
Kananaskis	  2002,”	  228.	  




recent commitment created feelings of doubt around the accountability and tenability of the G8’s other promises, 
and was a disappointing indication of the longevity of G8 commitments. 262 
iii. Africa: 
African development was the centerpiece of the summit, and was inclusive of many subjects, among them 
sustainable development, global growth, health, education and international security. Joined by several Africa 
heads of state (President Obasanjo, President Mbeki, President Wade and President Bouteflicka), Kananaskis 
marked the first real partnership between the G8 and African leaders. It provided the authors of NEPAD a unique 
opportunity to promote the program to Western leaders. At the conclusion of the summit, the G8 issued a statement 
highlighting the elements of the AAP. The document spoke to why and how the G8 was supporting NEPAD. It 
offered an “enhanced partnership” which would match African leaders’ commitment to NEPAD, and support 
countries which demonstrated a commitment to the rule of law, good governance and poverty alleviation. The AAP 
pointed to several areas of support, including resource mobilization; peace and security; governance; and human 
resources. The AAP represented a proactive and collaborative plan for addressing underdevelopment in Africa, and 
was a positive direction for its G8 signatories. G8 leaders also agreed that they would contribute up to $1 billion 
dollars toward the HIPC initiative at the summit. This was significant, as many of the HIPC nations were African. 
iv. The Role of Other G8 Nations 
African issues became central to the G8 agenda because of the AAP. Chrétien acted as a facilitator of the 
plan, and also as a policy entrepreneur, focused on making progress on African issues. Canada provided innovative 
and unique leadership for the AAP. But it was not alone in its desire to see the AAP and NEPAD succeed. This 
section discusses the role of Britain and France, both of which were ardent supporters of NEPAD and the AAP, 
and briefly summarizes some of the accomplishments of the other G8 nations in promoting African development 
around the time of Kananaskis.  
Britain was instrumental in the creation of the AAP, and was very supportive of Canada’s summit agenda. 
In many respects, Prime Minister Tony Blair spearheaded the G8’s initial involvement with NEPAD and was a 
“premier advocate” of African development.263 The New Labour government, which came in power in 1997, 
established the Department for International Development (DFID), which dedicated many resources to Africa.  
Britain’s contributions to African development continued into the early 2000’s, and Britain was the largest 
contributor to the Jubilee 2000 Relief Initiative. In 2000, Britain cancelled all bilateral debt with HIPCs.264 In 
January 2002, the UK established a US$350 million Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund, which Blair hoped 	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would gain the support of the G8 at Kananaskis.265 Blair worked alongside Chrétien to create a consensus at 
Kananaskis, and like Chrétien, traveled to Africa prior to the Kananaskis summit.   
France was another enthusiastic proponent of African development. Though the French APR cautioned 
realistic expectations about what the G8 could offer Africa, France treated the AAP as a priority issue.266  Prior to 
Kananaskis, France hosted a bilateral meeting with African leaders to gain perspective for the Kananaskis 
discussions. At the Monterrey Conference, French President Jacques Chirac announced an increase of ODA 
spending to 0.5% in five years, promising to raise it to 0.7% by 2012. France also cancelled all ODA debts from 
eligible HIPCs and committed to strengthening their bilateral programs.267 By the early 2000s, Britain, France and 
Canada proved to be the most ardent supporters of promoting African development through the G8.  
Other G8 nations also showed support for African development around this time.  Italy, which had the 
lowest rate of ODA of the G8 in 2002, was vocal in its approval of the AAP, particularly elements relating to 
conflict prevention and agricultural subsidies.268 At Monterrey, Italy dedicated funds to support poverty reduction 
programs in HIPC nations, and in mid-2002, cancelled large amounts of foreign debts owed by Uganda and 
Mozambique. Germany was an active partner in the drafting of the AAP. German representatives traveled to Africa 
prior to the Kananaskis summit, and hosted an Economic Conference on Africa in Germany, where Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder promoted the importance of the AAP.269 However, while Germany was supportive of the AAP, 
its primary interest at Kananaskis lay elsewhere, including the environment, strengthening global growth, and 
combating terrorism.270 Russia was late in appointing an APR and became only relatively engaged in the process of 
creating the AAP.271 However, in 2001, the Russian Federation hosted several African leaders in Moscow, 
extolling the virtues of the AAP publicly.272 Japan was less involved in the AAP than some of its counterparts. 
Facing huge public debt, the Japanese government identified economic growth and reform, environmental 
concerns, and relations with Russia as the top priorities. The AAP ranked low on the list273, and Japan’s African 
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policies were “designed around strategic concerns, including the need for African raw material.”274 In fact, Japan’s 
President Junichiro Koizumi “considered the 50% target [of increased aid] unrealistic.”275 The EU appeared 
enthusiastic about the AAP and African development. While it had yet to develop a truly integrated approach to 
poverty reduction, the EU was supportive of the AAP, and shortly before Kananaskis, EU members voted to 
increase their ODA spending, from an average of 0.33% of GNP to a rate of 0.39% by 2006.276 
The United States played a critical role in the AAP development and approval process. Like Japan, the US 
did not consider the target of a 50% increase of aid promised at Monterrey realistic, though National Security 
Advisor Condoleeza Rice indicated that this position might change should African nations meet the G8’s 
conditions.277 The US government did not treat the AAP as a priority issue at Kananaskis, especially in comparison 
to its concerns with terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), Middle East stability and strengthening the 
US economy. Even so, it was supportive of the African policy, making the link between poverty, instability and 
terrorism and looking to NEPAD and the AAP as a bulwark against terrorism.278 Like Canada, the US used the 
Monterrey Conference to promise increased aid to developing nations. However, Labonte et al. contend that this 
increase, while substantial at first glance, had to be “weighed against the current level of ODA...” and “the 
uncertainty of implementation and the worrisome proviso of conditions...”279  
While some G8 nations increased their ODA spending around the time of the Genoa and Kananaskis 
summits, including the US, the UK and Italy, others, such as Japan, saw their ODA numbers decline. However, it is 
important to note that the increased funding promised or provided by some G8 nations was still not commensurate 
with the needs of developing nations, especially those in Africa.280 
v. Outcomes of the Summit 
 The Kananaskis summit demonstrated leadership and commitment on behalf of the G8, particularly 
Canada, France and Britain. It was innovative in its format, and the G8 was able to reach agreements which were 
difficult to accomplish through other channels. It was effective, with leaders overcoming international and 
domestic pressure on high stakes topics, including debt relief, and the Global Partnership against the Spread of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The summit also displayed high levels of solidarity. Bayne asserts that Kananaskis 	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will be remembered as “one of the most successful G8 summits” in the G8’s history. It was well-organized, and 
largely free of the tensions of Genoa. Only two arrests were made over the span of the meetings. The AAP, a 
potential “instrument of historic change,” was refined and agreed upon.281 Kananaskis produced a total of 189 
commitments, 136 (72%) of which focused on African development, the highest number of commitments in 28 
years.282  An illustration of Kananaskis’ success came shortly after the meetings, when at Evian in 2003 President 
Chirac announced his intention to follow Chrétien’s summit model and emphasis on Africa.283 
What follows in Chapter five is an analysis of the Canadian position on the AAP at Kananaskis, applying 
the MS model. The analysis demonstrates that a policy window was successfully opened, and that new policies 
were pushed through, both in Canada and internationally—in large part because of the policy entrepreneurship of 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. The MS model explains how and why Chrétien was able to keep Africa as the top 
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Chapter Five: The Multiple Streams Model Applied 
  
Using John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams (MS) model, this chapter demonstrates how and why Jean 
Chrétien dedicated significant effort and resources to making development in sub-Saharan Africa a major foreign 
policy priority in 2002.284 The three streams are briefly addressed, before exploring Chrétien’s role as PE.  
5.1 Why and How African Aid Emerged on the Agenda for Canada 
The G8’s involvement with Africa is a multifaceted process. Consensus had to be created within the G8, 
within NEPAD and between G8 and African leaders.  The foreign policy decisions made in Canada and through 
the G8 were influenced and determined by both domestic and international elements.285 Canada’s position towards 
Africa was determined because of and through the G8. It is difficult to determine what Canada’s contribution might 
have been had Canada not worked in concert with other powers. Each G8 nation created its own plan, while 
working in concert with other G8 nations to achieve common goals.  
The MS model is well suited to analyze a variety of policy scenarios. It shows that policy making is rarely a 
linear process, and that a PE is required to couple the problem, policy and political streams. The MS model dictates 
that “an issue’s chance of gaining prominence in the agenda are enhanced when problems interact with solutions 
and politics to produce a single package acceptable to policymakers.”286 This is precisely what happened at 
Kananaskis with the African Action Plan (AAP).  
i. Problem 
 The problem here was inadequate aid contributions on behalf of Canada, particularly in the 1990s and early 
2000s. Under-development in African nations required increasing amounts of aid.287  At the turn of the millennium, 
much of Africa was continuing to fall behind in many areas of development. The disparity between the rich and the 
poor of Africa has been called “the greatest scandal of our age.”288 The problems of underdevelopment, including 
high mortality rates, low access to education, and lack health care and sustainable livelihoods, were increasing in 
the era of globalization. Many African nations suffered with low life expectancy, staggering conflicts, fiscal crises, 
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extreme poverty, increases in illness and disease and deep-seated governance issues. 289 While positive changes 
were gradually occuring in Africa over the years, by the turn of the millennium “the overall balance sheet seemed 
grim” and many countries continued to require aid.290 The following section addresses the three components of the 
problem stream, and argues that the dismal showing in Canadian development assistance was a problem in need of 
a solution. 
 
a) Indicators  
Indicators of problems come in many forms, including federal expenditures and studies conducted by 
government, academics, NGOs and think tanks.291 Indications came through budgetary expenditures, studies and 
reports leading up to Kananaskis. 
 
Federal Government Expenditures on Africa: 
 Canada’s commitment to African development at the onset of Chrétien’s Prime Ministership was minimal, 
particularly compared to Western nations of similar status.292 At the turn of the century, Canadian aid to 
developing nations was at its lowest level in thirty-seven years.293 Between 1992 and 2002, aid to Africa had 
plummeted by 40%. Canada’s share of ODA had fallen every year since 1993, and by 2002 stood at a meagre 
0.23%.294 These expenditures demonstrated that Canadian aid was diminishing despite the increased need for it 
worldwide. In a 2002 International Journal article, Andrew Cohen discussed Canada’s aid record, noting that 
Canada ranked number nineteen out of the twenty two OECD donor nations in 2001, with a total of 0.22 per cent 
of GNP allotted for aid. This was troubling given Canada’s vowed target of 0.7% of GNP just thirty years prior.295 
 
Studies on Canadian Development Assistance: 
The inadequacy of Canadian aid was highlighted in studies and reports. For instance, the Canadian medical 
community brought attention to the problem by publishing reports on underdevelopment on the African continent, 
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noting that Canada had to do more to alleviate the problems.296 One of the most evident indicators of struggles in 
Africa came in the form of HIV/AIDS statistics. At the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on 
HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) (summer 2001), Canada committed over $73 million dollars for HIV/AIDS programs in 
Africa and elsewhere. This represented “the highest point of engagement” of Canada with the AIDS epidemic.297  
Canada became a leader in the response to combating AIDS; however “Canada’s overall levels of assistance 
remained far below [their] capacity.”298  Studies from the early 2000’s show that Canadians were well meaning in 
terms of aid policy, yet it ranked low on the list compared to other federal priorities. For many Canadians, ODA 





b) Focusing Events 
Focusing events call attention to a problem. They come in the form of crises or symbols or through the 
personal experience of someone in government.  In this case, the turn of the millennium was itself a focusing event.  
Fifty years after African nations began achieving independence, many still struggled with poverty and 
underdevelopment. The Canadian media brought attention to poverty and underdevelopment in Africa, sensitizing 
large segments of the Canadian population to international development issues. 300 Organized campaigns such as 
Make Poverty History and the Jubilee 2000 Campaign also brought attention to African issues. 
In the early millennium, African underdevelopment became an issue that many celebrities became involved 
with. Well-known Canadians such as Jann Arden, Alex Trebek and Tom Cochrane drew attention to African 
causes and Canada’s role. Canadian-based mobilization efforts, such as the Kielburger brother’s social enterprise 
“Me to We,” brought awareness development issues. Academics and community activists such as Stephen Lewis 
were vocal on the spread of HIV/AIDS on the continent.301  Chrétien noted that “Canada has long been a friend of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296	  Examples	  include	  Fatal	  Indifference:	  The	  G8,	  Africa	  and	  Global	  Health	  by	  Ronald	  Labonte,	  David	  Sanders,	  Ted	  Schrecker	  (2004),	  
“Foreign	  Aid	  Must	  Increase,”	  The	  Star	  Phoenix	  by	  Steven	  Gibb,	  Les	  McaPherson,	  Sarath	  Peiris	  and	  Lawrence	  Thoner	  (Saskatoon,	  Sask.	  1	  
February	  1999,	  A4),	  “More	  Aid	  for	  AIDS”	  by	  Ash	  Khan,	  Calgary	  Herald,	  Calgary,	  Alberta,	  26	  July	  2001,	  A20,	  and	  “Illness	  Takes	  Heavy	  Toll	  
in	  Third	  World,”	  by	  Edith	  Gvora	  (Times-­‐Colonist,	  Victoria,	  British	  Columbia,	  10	  July	  2000,	  A7.)	  
297	  John	  W.	  Foster,	  “Canada	  and	  International	  Health:	  A	  Time	  of	  Testing	  on	  AIDS.”	  in	  Canada	  Among	  Nations	  2002:	  A	  Fading	  Power,	  eds	  
Normal	  Hillmer	  and	  Maureen	  Appel	  Molot.	  (Don	  Mills,	  Ontario:	  Oxford,	  2002),	  194.	  
298	  Foster,	  202.	  
299	  Jean-­‐Sébastien	  Rioux,	  "Canadian	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  Policy:	  Juggling	  the	  National	  Interest	  and	  Humanitarian	  Impulses,"	  
in	  Patrick	  James,	  Nelson	  Michaud,	  and	  Marc	  J.	  O'Reilly,	  eds.,	  Handbook	  of	  Canadian	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Oxford:	  Lexington	  Books,	  2006),	  210.	  	  
300	  For	  instance:	  Author	  Unknown.	  “Canada	  to	  stand	  behind	  United	  Nations	  at	  Millennium	  Summit.”	  Sudbury	  Star,	  Sudbury,	  Ontario.	  6	  
September	  2000,	  	  A11.	  




Africa...one million Canadians are of African descent.”302 The African Diaspora in Canada brought attention to the 
government’s development efforts.  African émigrés brought attention to the serious deficiencies in current aid 
programs and policies.303  
Crises are also significant focusing events in the problem stream.304  African crises appeared frequently in 
the late 1990s, garnering media attention.305 The violence and human rights abuses occurring in countries such as 
Ethiopia, Somalia and Rwanda through the 1990s contributed to the growing awareness of African issues. A 
collective shame was felt by the world for failing to properly intervene during these catastrophes.306  
Focusing events can come as a result of the personal experiences of bureaucrats and politicians. Chrétien 
had African experience, as did Canada’s G8 Sherpa, Robert Fowler.307  In 2001, Chrétien traveled to Africa to 
liaise with state leaders. This experience influenced the way that Chrétien presented issues to his government, his 
constituents and international audience.  The French language facilitated an especially unique relationship with 
French West Africa. Chrétien had personal connections to Africa. His nephew and Canadian Ambassador to the 
US, Raymond Chrétien, was UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Zaire (now the DRC) in fall of 1996. Jean 
Chrétien was made aware of the intensity of this crisis in part through his nephew, and he sent a Canadian army 
commander to Zaire to appraise the situation.308 Though no multinational force was sent to mitigate in Zaire, this 
example demonstrates that Chrétien was listening to feedback about Africa and was repeatedly brought face to face 
with symbols and crises which represented aspects of the problem.309 His personal experience was a focusing 
event, though the absence of meaningful action served to further demonstrate that Canada’s policies toward Africa 
required more work.   
The UN Millennium Summit was held in September 2000, at which one hundred and forty seven countries 
declared their commitment to alleviating poverty in a sustainable way.310 This focusing event drew attention to the 
severity of global underdevelopment and the monumental task of alleviating it. The “Millennium Development 
Goals” (MDGs) were created and committed to by 192 countries and aimed to decrease poverty and improve 	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people’s quality of life by 2015.311 In response to this commitment, CIDA tied five key areas of development to the 
MDGs, focusing their efforts in a more targeted way.312  
Genoa itself was a focusing event. With NEPAD leaders in attendance, Genoa demonstrated that Africa 
needed more help from the G8. It created focus for the Liberal government and CIDA. Chrétien was keenly aware 
that the world would be watching as he took his turn at G8 host, particularly as he became pressured to retire.  
Expectations that Africa would be a priority at Kananaskis were high. Chrétien had to ensure that the political 
environment was receptive. He had to engineer a summit at which real progress was made, demonstrating that the 




 Feedback demonstrates that a problem exists and that action is required. It comes through the assessment 
of existing programs and operations. Feedback regarding the inadequacies of Canadian ODA came from a number 
of sources. For instance, NGOs expressed their dissatisfaction through media appearances, protests and published 
reports on the Canadian government’s aid programs.314  
Feedback came from constituent letters, opinion pieces, and editorials in newspapers authored by academics and 
community members. Such feedback asserted that, though Canada had a reputation as “peacekeeper,” it failed to 
live up to this acclaim, even as “popular sentiments continued to support Canadian engagement with the complex 
humanitarian crises of the post-Cold War era” and Canada sought to regain its image as “the world’s Boy Scouts.” 
315 Canadians wanted to live up to the reputation as a “helping” nation, a reputation that was diminishing in the 
eyes of other countries.316 Through indicators, focusing events and feedback, it became clear that Canada’s 
internationally standing was slipping. 	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The policy stream is where policy alternatives are articulated and discussed. Kingdon contends that ideas do 
not get adopted because they are new, but rather because their time has come.  
 
a) The Monterrey Consensus and the Canada Fund for Africa 
In the early 2000s, the inadequacy of development efforts of the G8 loomed large in the public eye. The 
Canadian government initiated two efforts designed to increase aid to Africa: the funds promised at Monterrey 
Conference, and the creation of the Canada Fund for Africa. Both demonstrated that Canada was committed to 
African development.  
At Kananaskis, G8 leaders announced that half of the funds promised at Monterrey would be directed to 
Africa. The AAP and the Monterrey Consensus were closely tied—the AAP was a driving factor for, and the main 
beneficiary from, Monterrey.317 The decision of how much of the Monterrey commitment would go to African aid 
was a contentious one. In a 2002 North-South Institute report, author Roy Culpeper pointed to “deep division” 
between G8 nations apparent in the final AAP document.318 It reads: “we believe that in aggregate half or more of 
our new development assistance could [emphasis added] be directed to African nations that govern justly, invest in 
their own people and promote economic freedom.”319 This meant that the amount of money dedicated to Africa 
could be less than the $6 billion promised. Culpeper deemed the commitment inadequate to meet the needs of 
impoverish African nations.320 Nevertheless, the Monterrey Consensus was a powerful policy response to NEPAD 
by Canada. It provided Chrétien with a highly publicised venue to demonstrate his government’s commitment to 
increasing ODA.  It also demonstrated the G8’s commitment to the MDGs.  
 The Canada Fund for Africa was a commitment to improve aid to Africa. It financed initiatives announced 
at the end of the Kananaskis summit. The Fund was Canada-specific, and therefore not specifically “Kananaskis 
deliverable.”321 But Chrétien felt it important that, “as host and chair of the process that led to the creation of the 
APP, he “walk the talk; in terms of putting the brave words of the AAP into immediate, significant and far-
reaching action.”322 He led by example, demonstrating high level leadership and working to ensure that the G8 	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adopted the AAP.  A “truly impressive package of projects and policy prescriptions,” the Fund was an indication 
that the Canadian government was committed to “making the AAP a living reality.”323  
 Around the same time, Canada unveiled other initiatives designed to support the AAP. In June 2002, 
Chrétien announced that, in the spirit of the NEPAD, Canada would open its markets to nearly all products from 
LDCs beginning in 2003. He also communicated Canada’s intention of doubling its investment in education in 
Africa by 2005. Chrétien remained determined to “follow through on [Canada’s] commitment to untie its official 
development assistance and to deliver aid more effectively on the basis of country-driven strategies and 
priorities.”324  
 
b) The African Action Plan 
Using both economic and political measures, the AAP drew comparisons with the post-World War II 
Marshall Plan. Affirmed at Kananaskis, the AAP was very much in line with CIDA’s 2001 document 
Strengthening Aid Effectiveness, which emphasized more tightly focused aid sectors and better coordination with 
the donor community.325 Calling NEPAD a “bold and clear sighted vision of African development,” the G8 
designed the AAP to “encourage the imaginative effort that underlies NEPAD and to lay a solid foundation for 
future co-operation.”326 The AAP had the power to steer the response of eight of the world’s richest nations to the 
challenge of underdevelopment. It concentrated on two areas of political concern and six economic areas.327 It 
covered many areas of development and addressed resource mobilization, peace and security, governance and 
human resources and was designed as a “road map” to develop a sustainable partnership with Africa.328 It included 
provisions for good governance, while supporting citizens of states with poor governance structures329. Through 
the AAP, the G8 addressed NEPAD and confronted far-reaching and underlying aspects of development, and 
committed to work with NEPAD’s principles, with a focus on rewarding countries adhering to its spirit.330  
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Chrétien faced a great deal of pressure to develop a policy acceptable to not only the G8 leaders, but also to 
the G8’s domestic constituents and NEPAD leaders. He succeeded in getting all G8 members to sign on to the 
AAP, though he failed to get a firm commitment to direct fifty per cent of the money promised at Monterrey to 
Africa.  The vague promises of the AAP had some summit watchers sceptical about the lasting impact of the plan.  
 
c) Consensus-Building and Softening Up: Persuasion and Diffusion 
Building consensus and softening up individuals to an idea are key elements of the policy process. 
Consensus is built through persuasions and diffusion.  Diffusion occurs through “bandwagoning.”331 Softening up 
is necessary for a policy proposal to be taken seriously by those in government.332 Much of this occurs in the 
“policy soup” of policy communities, which Kingdon likens to the evolutionary process, and which is discussed 
further below.333 At Genoa, NEPAD creators were able to build consensus around the importance of supporting the 
partnership by presented their policy to the G8.334  In the lead-up to Kananaskis, Chrétien and his government 
devoted resources to persuading G8 members to support the AAP.  Chrétien created APRs, who were also 
instrumental in this process. Canada helped soften up the G8 to the idea of NEPAD through its role as 
“interlocutor.”335  
Chrétien’s priorities at Kananaskis, particularly in the area of development, coincided with former Foreign 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s emphasis on human security—an issue which had received attention in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. This emphasis was visible in the AAP, and Axworthy’s achievements were responsible for much 
of the softening up and consensus-building that occurred in Canada. 
Canadian Sherpa and APR Fowler was in an extraordinary position to create consensus on African 
development policy.336 He recalled that, “in view of the evident dissatisfaction with normal communications 
methods and channels, we established an extraordinary outreach program”:  The Canadian government conducted 
public consultations for ten months between Genoa and Kananaskis, to combat the perception that the G8 was an 
unresponsive instrument lacking transparency. 337  The consultations “reached into most population centres across 
Canada,” building consensus and softening up Canadians to the Canada Fund, Monterrey Consensus and AAP.338 
Canada also reached out to the NGO community, conducting consultations abroad.339 Chrétien travelled to six 
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African nations in the spring of 2002, and met with members of the Commonwealth and la Francophonie.340 He 
also attended meetings of the Economic Commission for Africa and the Organization for African Unity in 
Ethiopia. He made appeals “all over the world in support of the African centrepiece of the Kananaskis agenda.”341 
An April 2002 meeting in Dakar, Senegal was opened by Chrétien, who took the opportunity to assure delegates 
“that Africa remains a focus area of the G8.”342 
The APRs also worked to create consensus, holding six meetings in between Genoa and Kananaskis, at 
which members of NEPAD Steering Group and NEPAD’s Heads of State Implementation Committee were often 
present. The APRs met with the African diplomatic corps, as well as civil society representatives, to discuss the 
AAP. They held national consultations to build consensus for the policy proposals and to establish dialogue. 
Fowler met with 105 organizations and 121 groups and individuals to discuss Canada and the G8’s policy to 
Africa. Fowler noted that “the centrality of the African initiative was widely, even fervently, supported...”343  The 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade conducted hearings across Canada 
on the Kananaskis meeting. Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham and Governor General Adrienne Clarkson 
worked to build consensus, even as the summit itself was taking place.344 The work of Chrétien and other high 
ranking officials displayed a personal investment in the AAP.  
 
The Decision-Making Agenda and the Governmental Agenda: 
 The governmental agenda is comprised of general issues to which people in and around government pay 
attention. The decision making agenda is where matters up for active decision are found. Typically, it is where 
solutions are developed, and where softening up occurs. Once an issue has risen past the governmental agenda onto 
the decision making agenda, organized political forces begin to shape policy and its outcomes.345 The problem of 
weak development assistance had been on the Canadian decision-making agenda for decades. After Canada’s fiscal 
standings improved, and the country became a signatory to the UN MDGs, increasing ODA to developing 
countries rose to the governmental agenda. The Canada Fund for Africa and the Monterrey Consensus were two 
policies which moved from the decision-making agenda to the governmental agenda relatively swiftly. The AAP 
moved nearly as fast. The decision and governmental agenda changed post-9/11, because increased attention was 
paid to international affairs. Politics and security were “suddenly on everyone’s agenda...” 9/11 helped to propel 
African development to the governmental agenda, while at the same time threatening to take the attention off of 
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development and on to terrorism.346 Ideas are created, altered and destroyed in the policy stream. The Canada Fund 
and the Monterrey consensus survived because they were supported by Canadians and the wider policy 
community. The AAP survived after going through the policy process. It “bumped up” against other ideas, 
evolving along the way before developing into its final form. 
iii. Politics 
Politics is the third stream of the MS model. Developments here have the most powerful impact on 
agendas. Elements of the stream include public opinion, national mood, organized political forces, and political 
turnover and jurisdiction. Consensus-building occurs in this stream as well, through bargaining and coalition 
building. It is here where the G8’s partnership with NEPAD became a reality. 
 
a) Swings in National Mood: 
Government officials gather opinions through mail, phone calls, social movements, media, lobbyists and 
polls, and other sources. These indicators, cumulatively called “the national mood” provide fertile ground for 
ideas.347 People in and around government are sensitive to national mood because it can affect policy agendas and 
political outcomes. It also serves as a constraint on policy alternatives, as ideas are judged in the court of public 
opinion.  National mood was certainly a factor in this case. Canadian views on ODA had shifted since the early 
1990s, when fiscal restraint was practiced. Individuals were paying increased attention to G8 decisions, in part 
because of 9/11.348 Through focusing events, the dire situation of less developed nations had come to the public’s 
attention. Chrétien wanted the G8 to produce better results under his leadership. Moreover, as his political career 
reached its twilight, many speculated that a legacy-minded Chrétien wanted to be remembered for contributions to 
the international community.349 
 National mood is observed through public polling. A winter 2002 poll in Canadian news magazine 
Maclean’s asked Canadians for their opinions on the Kananaskis summit. Readers were asked if, with protests 
expected at the meeting, the summit should proceed as scheduled.350 Seventy-seven per cent of respondents said 
meetings should proceed; only twenty one per cent advocated them being cancelled.351 When asked about a 	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confrontation between the police and protestors, the majority of respondents sided with police.352  Polls like these 
may have influenced the Canadian government’s decision to forge ahead with the summit.  
Historically, Canadians have been supportive of ODA—at least in theory.  Even as governments changed, 
sentiments regarding ODA remain largely consistent. “As aid budgets were slashed in the 1990s”, observed Tomlin 
et al., “only a small majority of Canadians favoured an increase in them, although a strong majority continued to 
express their support for the general principle of development assistance.”353 But this discord between what 
constituents claimed to want, and what was favoured when it came to hard fiscal times, was felt profoundly by the 
government. Fowler observed that, at the turn of the 21st century, “Africa became once again a legitimate area of 
endeavour. Concern for Africa had become respectable. Afro-pessimism was no longer in vogue. The perception of 
Africa’s need changed from that of a desperate situation beyond repair to a challenge and rallying cry to the rest of 
the world.”354  This sentiment was encouraging for the success of the Canada Fund, the Monterrey Consensus and 
the AAP.  A shift in national mood, coupled with healthier economic times, resulted in increased aid for Africa 
becoming more likely.  
 
b) Public Opinion: 
Public opinion has a profound effect on the political stream. The media influences the political stream, and 
in particular public opinion, in many ways. Most people are removed from the daily occurrences of foreign policy, 
and learn of events through the media.  Media impacts the volume of Canadian ODA and how it is spent. It is a 
channel through which to observe national mood and public opinion.355 The media presents a particular view of the 
developing world to Canadians and due to gaps in reporting, “few Canadians were aware of the spending cuts that 
occurred” in the late 21st century.356 This can result in the public overestimating levels of aid spending and lead to 
biased opinions on the need to increased or decreased foreign aid.357  Tomlin et al. report that, “as a barometer of 
national mood, the Canadian media’s view of ODA has generally been one of indifference except when crises or 
scandals have erupted to make headlines.”358 Opinion data from 2001 showed that 76.4% of Canadians believed 
that it was “important to provide assistance to poor countries” and 53% of Canadians thought that “Canada should 
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increase the amount of aid that the nation currently provides.”359 Data such as this can influence government and 
the decisions they make, and the actions they take through instruments such as the G8. 
The G8 has endeavoured to appear more inclusive. By inviting outside leaders and organizations, it has 
strengthened how it is viewed politically. Greater inclusion led to increased political legitimacy for the summit.360 
By 2002, public opinion about the summit had changed. This was due to many factors, including the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, after which people were perhaps more likely to trust the state, as they faced the outside threats of 
violence. After the violence of Genoa, some questioned the need for the G8, especially considering the perceived 
costs and absence of results. The G8 was eager to move past its troubled image, and 9/11 served to galvanize many 
of the G8’s domestic constituencies. Terrorist threats influened the national mood and public opinion, deepening 
and broadening a “sense of common vulnerability,” and reinforcing the “global centrality of G-7/8 institutions in 
responding to such common enemies”.361 This placed a “premium on Canada’s role as incoming chair” and 
motivated the political powers of the G8 to create a more benevolent image. 362 
 
c) Election Results, Change in Administration, Turnover and Change: 
Election results and turnovers in administration have a serious impact on the political stream. A turnover 
can bring new agenda items to the table. In the G8, turnover occurred through the predictable, yearly change of the 
G8 host. There was also potential turnover within the Canadian government: Chrétien faced serious pressure from 
members of his own party to relinquish power. Creating a political legacy was, according to some, in the forefront 
of Chrétien’s mind as he engineered the Kananaskis agenda. Building a partnership with NEPAD through the AAP 
represented a potential legacy-making policy. This might have been one of Chrétien’s motives for working so hard 
on the African issue, despite having relatively little interest in foreign policy in the preceding years. A lack of 
turnover was also influential in this stream. Too much turnover can be a detrimental occurrence.363 The same 
leaders from Genoa attended Kananaskis; the sole newcomer was EU President, José María Aznar. The NEPAD 
leaders were at both Genoa and Kananaskis, though in 2002 they took part as full participants instead of observers. 
This continuity was integral to the success of the summit and AAP.  
Chrétien was one of the most experienced of G8 leaders. He had hosted a successful summit in Halifax 
(1995). He was among the most seasoned politicians of the group, involved in national politics since 1963 and 
having attended his first G-7 meeting as Finance Minister in 1978. In fact, each of the G8 leaders had a relatively 
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large pool of political experience to draw from. This experience was important, as electoral uncertainty and leader 
inexperience can distract leaders.364  
 
d)  Organized Political Forces: 
Organized political forces include interest group campaigns, the behaviour of political elites, and political 
mobilization. It is here that interests align. When parties agree on policy, powerful momentum can develop. 
NEPAD was an important organized political force, driven by African leaders. By allowing outsiders to take part in 
summit proceedings, the G8 demonstrated its commitment to work with others to create an enhanced 
partnership.365 The Sherpas were also an organized political force. Preparation conducted by the Sherpas permitted 
the heads of government to reach agreements in a short period of time, with logistics already decided upon.  
NGOs were also notable political forces. The G8 received a great deal of attention from these groups. 
Pressure group campaigns advocating increased funds to Africa have often been spearheaded by NGOs.366 Groups 
such as Oxfam and Make Poverty History promoted policies of debt forgiveness, increased trade liberalization and 
development programmes on G8 members, including Canada. NGOs drew the attention of politicians, media and 
those in government to the need for increased development assistance to Africa. Having long exerted influence on 
government, they worked to bring awareness to issues and generate policy alternatives. Dating back to the 
Birmingham summit (1998), the G8 has made a point of meeting with NGOs prior to and even during summit 
meetings.367   Chrétien took pains to ensure that they were included in the dialogue leading to the summit.368 
An important element of organized political forces is political mobilization, meaning the way in which 
“political actors attempt to influence the distribution of power.”369 Chrétien’s international experience, domestic 
popularity, and ‘”home court advantage” allowed him to mobilize the G8 to create an effectual response to the 
NEPAD. Additionally, at the time of Genoa and Kananaskis, the G7/8 was becoming a more balanced multilateral 
instrument: “capabilities [had] become more equal with the revival of Russia, the relatively strong growth of 
Canada and Britain, the plunge of the United States into a sharpened recession since 11 September, the further fall 
of a long stagnant Japan, and significant economic slowdown in third ranked Germany.”370 The result was that 
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Canada was able to secure a more influential position within the group and better mobilize political forces to secure 
the outcomes that it desired. 371 
 
Consensus-building: bargaining and coalition building 
Consensus in the political stream is achieved through bargaining and coalition-building. As in the policy 
stream, “once adherents of a particular alternative have grown sufficiently in number, then the balance of support 
will tip overwhelmingly in the direction of that option.”372 Concessions are granted in return for supporting a 
particular policy.  Chrétien was able to point to his own strong domestic policies, therein demonstrating his 
political resolve to follow through with policies benefiting Africa. This gave him legitimacy when he urged others 
to do the same.  He attempted to portray aid dollars to Africa as an investment, as opposed to pure charity.373 By 
creating a dialogue with NEPAD leaders, consensus was built beyond the G8. 
 The threat of terrorism also created consensus in this stream. International security was high on the agenda. 
Consensus was built as the link between terrorism and poverty was made. At the United Nations headquarters in 
2002, Chrétien argued persuasively for the AAP: 
Helping Africa get on it [sic] feet is in our interest from the perspective of our 
common humanity. From the perspective of creating a more prosperous world with 
new markets. And it is profoundly in our self-interest from the point of view of our 
own security. We have seen it right here in New York with tragic consequences that 
can result from failed states in far away places. Simply put...we can’t afford not to 
address these issues. It is time to act. NEPAD is the blueprint. The rest is simply a 
matter of political will.374 
 
This demonstrates how Chrétien built consensus in different ways, depending on his audience. Here he depicted aid 
to Africa as a way to increase economic prosperity, and to mitigate terrorism emerging from the developing world.  
The G8 is unique in its ability to establish “linkages between topics” and striking “cross-issue deals” among 
member nations.375 These cross-issue agreements, often achieved through intense bargaining, were the “highest 
form of cooperation at the summit.”376  Cooperation was evident in the AAP.377 The G8 had to overcome divides in 
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political philosophies, for example, between those more liberal in their politics (among them Canada and the UK) 
and those with more right leaning tendencies (such as France and the US). Chrétien had to create consensus with 
G8 members and in particular Russia, Japan, the US and Germany. He had to compromise and bargain with nations 
with other priorities.378 Just days before the summit, US President George W. Bush made a highly-publicised 
speech on the Middle East in which he suggested replacing President Yasser Arafat. This speech, and his focus on 
security in the region, was viewed as a distraction from Africa. Chrétien worked with Bush to find common 
ground, and by linking terrorism to underdevelopment in Africa.379 Creating relationships with other leaders was 
important in this case, particularly as, in the case of the AAP, the direct interventions of the G8 leaders were 
necessary.380 
Supporting the AAP allowed leaders to appear responsive to pressures to improve development to Africa 
and to rehabilitate the G8’s tarnished image. A G8 government raising serious objections to NEPAD or the AAP 
might have faced criticisms, appearing unconcerned with matters of underdevelopment in Africa. 
The Canadian government was determined to see the AAP policy adopted by the G8, becoming “so 
energetic in advocating NEPAD that various Africa civil society groups and parliamentarians became suspicious 
that this was really a Canadian set of proposals being circulated through key African leaders!” Chrétien attempted 
to create consensus among the parties, downplaying differences and creating unity. While there was some split on 
what the G8 response to the NEPAD entailed, Chrétien created cohesion and consensus amongst the G98 members 
and other concerned parties.381  
5.2 Policy Entrepreneur and the Policy Window 
A PE couples the streams and pushes them through an open policy window. Entrepreneurs identify 
problems, shaping how they are viewed and interpreted by those making the decisions.382 PEs can be found 
anywhere; however a claim to hearing is central to his or her success. PEs are frequently found in and around 
government and policy communities. These individuals invest resources, time and money advocating for their 
preferred solution. Typically, the PE is someone in or near government, but is rarely the head of government. In 
this case, Chrétien was optimally placed to act as PE, and the evidence shows that he performed that role. The 
study of a head of government as PE is a unique contribution to the MS model. 	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The success of a G8 summit depends on the leaders who design and execute it.383 As summit host, Jean 
Chrétien bore this responsibility. Many have professed surprise at his “sudden” interest in Africa, yet it was not 
impulsive as some have claimed. Chrétien’s political involvement in Africa can be traced to the mid-1990s. 
Chrétien attended his first summit as Prime Minister in 1994 in Naples, Italy. From then on, he was “constantly 
talking about Africa, raising its crises, and pushing for action.”384 At the 1997 Denver summit, he “led the 
discussion on the political issues facing Africa and pressed the United States and the European Union to improve 
their preferential tariff regimes to help integrate the Africans into the global economy” with the support of Blair 
and Chirac.385 As the domestic budget crises subsided, development assistance to Africa received more attention 
from Chrétien. He put more focus on Africa, and he voiced regret regarding cuts to African ODA during the 
1990s.386  
Why did Chrétien focus on Africa to such an unprecedented extent?387 He might have viewed formalizing a 
solid Canadian development policy towards African as his legacy. Furthermore, Canadians clearly wanted ODA to 
be a key part of foreign policy. Canada’s leadership in Africa “conformed with and reinforced a ‘human 
internationalist’ self-image that has enjoyed substantial and longstanding appeal among the Canadian public and 
Canadian elites.”388  Canada was in a unique place to help—both as a member of the Commonwealth and la 
Francophonie, and as a G8 nation. Canada had a rather “benign image” in Africa.389 A plan for Africa was already 
partially constructed at Genoa, making Chrétien’s work easier, and other leaders were also enthusiastic about the 
plan. As host, Chrétien was in an ideal position to engineer a response to NEPAD. 
Chrétien’s personal interest in Africa led him to be an entrepreneur. When he entered office, he “became 
absorbed in the issues of Africa, not least because all but a few African nations are members of either the 
Commonwealth or la francophonie.”390 He reflected that “the more I met with their leaders, the more involved I 
became in their agendas, the more I wanted Canada to help.”391 Hosting the summit gave him the opportunity to 
shift the focus “onto real matters of governance.”392 But Chrétien faced many challenges. He needed to secure the 
required resources for financing the AAP. He had to convince the other G8 leaders, among them President Bush, of 
the merit of the AAP. He to ensure that terrorism did not take center stage, in turn relegating Africa to a minor 
issue. He had to convince the media, civil society and the general public of the importance of the plan. Finally, he 	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had to foster consensus between the G8 and the African leaders. While he may not have succeeded on all of these 
fronts, Chrétien’s efforts were instrumental in securing support for the AAP.  
A successful PE recognises and seizes opportunities. Chrétien realized that Kananaskis was an optimal 
chance to create change. He endeavoured to ensure that leaders were supportive of the AAP, and attempted to 
mediate between parties to ensure that this unity was accomplished.393  As “chief architect” of the broad reforms 
for Africa tabled at Kananaskis, Chrétien used “will and skill” to bring Bush on board with the African 
initiatives.394  The Canadian Prime Minister also used his adeptness at summit diplomacy to create consensus and 
cohesiveness.395 Though his approach at summits can be described as “low key,” his experience with summits was 
beneficial in achieving his goals.396 
Reflecting on Kananaskis, Chrétien explained that, “Canada decided to devote a whole day to discussing 
Africa and the NEPAD process, even though we knew that the Americans weren’t comfortable with the subject.” 
397 Chrétien’s determination to pursue this “pet solution,” is indicative of his behaviour as a PE. Typically, the 
majority of the planning and preparation takes place in the months prior to the G8 summit and is engineered largely 
by the leaders’ ministers and policy makers. Chrétien’s high level of involvement was the exception. He kept the 
agenda focused on Africa in the transition from Genoa to Kananaskis. His 2002 trip to Africa lent legitimacy and 
conviction to his goals. Chrétien took the lead in making African development the highest priority at Kananaskis, 
and was called the “unrivalled dean of the club at Kananaskis.”398  Those who worked with Chrétien at the time 
reported he had a “strong sense of identification with issues of poverty in Africa.” 399  The path for Africa had been 
partially set at Genoa, and he was determined to follow it through, the way “he had long felt it should.”400 He tied 
the issue of terrorism to the issue of development, so as to not lose sight of either. This is demonstrative of his 
ability to keep the emphasis on the chosen agenda.401  In making the link between terrorism, poverty and 
underdevelopment (regardless of the credibility and reality of this link402), Chrétien was able to draw other leaders 
to supporting the AAP by presenting it as not only a solution to many of Africa’s problems. 	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Many were sceptical about the timing of Chrétien’s newfound interest in Africa and observed that he had 
no particular interest in the region until the end of his political career. Van Westuizen (2003) argued that 
“Chrétien’s personal interest in NEPAD was consistent with a pattern often displayed in the twilight years of a 
Prime Minister.”403  Chrétien’s lobbying has been portrayed as a thinly-veiled attempt to garner respect and 
preserve or shape his reputation. In his 2003 Chrétien biography Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chretien 
(2003), Lawrence Martin notes that, to critics, the Prime Minister’s desire to have the AAP adopted by the G8 had 
the “desperate look of a Chrétien-come-lately to salvage some respect, especially given the heavy cuts in foreign 
aid in his early years in power.” 404  Cohen (2004) claimed that “All of a sudden, Jean Chrétien discovered 
Africa...It held no attraction for him in his first eight and a half years of stewardship...So behold Saint Jean of 
Dakar and Addis Ababa, saviour of Africa’s struggling masses.”405  Clearly, scepticism existed. 
Chrétien refuted allegations that his motives were part of a legacy plan, stating “I don’t give a damn about 
legacy.”406 In the 2002 Address by Chrétien to the Speech to the Throne, he stated: “I have never been concerned 
about a legacy. I have always been concerned about getting the job done. The job I was elected to do. The coming 
months will be no different. This is not about legacy. This is about good government.”407 Even if Chrétien’s 
motives at Kananaskis were rooted in a legacy bid, it is inconsequential.  Chrétien wanted to seize an opportunity, 
already set in motion at Genoa.  Kananaskis was a chance to bolster the development record of Canada and its 
government and to improve his own image.408  Altruistic motives are not a prerequisite of a PE. However, the MS 
model notes that self-interest is not enough to explain policy decisions.  
The AAP was created prior to Chrétien’s term as G8 meeting host, but he created the momentum required 
to finalize the policy. He argued that there was both a moral obligation to and an economic interest in helping 
Africa and he used his experience, skill, charisma and position in the government to accomplish his goals. He 
coupled the three streams, and overcame barriers to achieve the success of the AAP. His ability to draw all the G8 
leaders into supporting the policy was a “stylistic triumph” and an excellent example of a PE at work.409   
Chrétien provided the leadership required for a policy window to open successfully. Canada was “first out 
of the gate” in promoting African development at Kananaskis and the Canada Fund for Africa was the “only 
substantial new commitment to the continent made in connection with the Summit.”410 In fact, “No other country 	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[came] close to the enthusiasm of Canada.”411 While some view Canada’s leadership in this case as purely 
circumstantial, others, including Stephen Langdon (2003), disagree. Canada, along with Britain and France, 
earnestly wanted to see the AAP adopted by the G8 and this went beyond simply fulfilling a mandate as summit 
host. 412  These leaders came out as strong supporters of NEPAD, cultivating an appropriate response. Summit host 
Chrétien facilitated the success of the AAP policy. 413  He steered the G8 meetings towards his predetermined goal, 
despite other agenda items threatening to take over the meetings.414 
5.3 The Policy Window 
A window opens when the streams align and are coupled by a PE. Leadership alone cannot open a policy 
window. Rather, windows typically open because a problem has been recognized by government, or because there 
has been a change or event in the political stream.415 The only way to know whether a window was successfully 
opened is through a test of successful advocacy. In this case, the three streams aligned: the problem was worsening, 
the policy had been proposed at Genoa as well as domestically in Canada, and, in the political stream, the 
Kananaskis summit was taking place, with an emphasis being placed on African development.  Domestically, the 
Canadian economy was flourishing and the government faced fewer budget restrictions than it had in earlier times. 
This resulted in a window being able to open.  
An open window does not guarantee change, especially if the streams are not aligned in time or long 
enough, or if a PE is not present to join the streams and push them through the window. In this case, the problem 
had existed for years, the policy was in place, and the political motivation was there. The timing was right for 
NEPAD and the AAP. Ian Taylor and Phillip Nel  (2002) conclude: “it was inevitable that [NEPAD] would be well 
received by the G8 since it was spot on in terms of timing and political correctness. When you have rioters trashing 
Genoa in the name of kinder Third World treatment, no politician is going to say it is a bad idea.”416 
What did the successful opening of a window mean? For Africa, it meant the promise of more aid from G8 
nations. For the G8, it represented a new partnership through which development dollars were targeted according 
to country performance and need. It also created a more favourable image for the G8. The successful policy of the 
AAP brought African issues—and solutions—to the international agenda. Kananaskis was “pivotal in bringing 
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African issues to the forefront of the world’s concerns and setting the bar high.”417 The AAP was a “new beginning 
and a fresh hope for the African continent,” through which the G8 operated as a collectivity to ensure that 
globalization worked in favour of all people and that “no continent is left behind.”418 For the G8, the approval and 
implementation of the AAP is indicative of a window opening. The acceptance of NEPAD and the creation of the 
AAP was one of the most impressive liaisons with non-G8 governments in G8 history. Because the policy was 
adopted and acted upon, a window was successfully opened and successful advocacy was achieved. 
Changes in CIDA were further evidence of the successful opening of a policy window. The organization 
received praise from the OECD’s DAC, which stated that CIDA should be commended for “broadening and 
deepening the organizational change” and focusing on a “programme and country focused organization operating 
within the framework of developing country driven strategies, aimed notably at poverty reduction and the 
achievement of the MDGs.”419 The DAC called CIDA’s new direction a “major policy breakthroughs in aid 
volume and on the wider policy coherence front.”420 A window was successfully opened domestically, as CIDA 
created a fresh approach to aid and development, influenced by the G8 summits in Genoa and Kananaskis.  
 Through Canada’s leadership, African development was elevated on both the national and international 
agenda, and a policy window opened at Kananaskis. Yet the Canadian government faced setbacks. Canada was not 
able to influence the US as much as it would have liked, and US enthusiasm about NEPAD was tepid.  US 
reluctance resulted in the G8’s constrained response to NEPAD in the form of “longer-term help, rather than 
initiating a major and immediate co-ordinated effort.”421 While this does not affect the opening of a policy window, 
it does cast doubt upon the lasting impact of the G8’s commitment to NEPAD and its ultimate chances for success. 
Though Kananaskis displayed the ability of “Canadian policy-makers to shape agendas concerning Africa”, it also 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
The Kananaskis summit was well organized and orchestrated by its Canadian hosts. The leadership 
maintained a narrow focus on the three main agenda items and ensured the involvement of non-G8 leaders in the 
discussions. The partnership between the G8 and the NEPAD leaders was “highly innovative”,  giving "priority to 
Africa as a key element of [the G8’s] fight against the root causes of terrorism.”423  Shortly after the summit, 
Fowler stated that he believed that the AAP commitments would be “substantial, substantive, and eminently 
measurable.” He contended that the enhanced partnerships of the AAP would ensure that “one plan with many 
executions” could help African nations with their development.424 Kananaskis initiated a “sustained process of 
engagement with African issues and governments.” Chrétien was behind much of this success.425 The G8 
combined economic and political elements into a cohesive strategy. Its response to NEPAD was harmonious with 
its stance on other political and economic matters, and fit well with the overall strategy of the group. The APR 
position was maintained as a mechanism to track the AAP’s progress. 426  
Opinions on the summit were mixed. Many applauded Canada for its leadership on African issues. But 
others felt that the AAP did not do enough. NEPAD leaders were disappointed in some respects, particularly when 
it came to the limits the US put on aid flows.427  There was also dismay regarding the state of US trade measures 
and the fact that no new funds were pledged at the summit itself.428 As for the lasting success of the AAP, Fowler 
cautioned that expectations had to be “tempered with healthy doses of reality...” and stated that there would be 
setbacks as well as progress.429 This reflects a stark reality of development and multilateral organizations: even 
with a solid plan in place, an organization with no enforcement mechanism cannot compel its contemporaries to 
act. The AAP requires constituents to hold the leaders accountable to their promises. It remained to be seen what 
level of commitment would follow in summits to come. However, ultimately, for the MS model, “adopting 
promised policies is more important than actually solving any problems.”430 
This thesis has demonstrated that John Kingdon’s MS model is a suitable framework for understanding and 
explaining Canadian development assistance through the G8 and domestically. It has answered the three main 
questions raised in Chapter One. It has shown that African development assistance became a priority for Canada in 	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the early millennium due to an improving national fiscal climate, and because of a shift in priorities for Chrétien. 
Chrétien was able to act as a leader and innovator in this case for several reasons. As Canadian head of 
government, he was ideally placed to act as a PE and to initiate and sustain change, both nationally and 
internationally.  He had personal experience with Africa, and with working through multilateral channels, such as 
la Francophonie and the Commonwealth.  As host of the Kananaskis summit, he set the agenda for the meeting, 
placing African development front and center at the meetings.  He led by ensuring that Canada was seen as a leader 
of African development in 2001-2002, and by insisting that Kananaskis kept its focus on African issues, even as 
the concern of terrorism threatened to take over the agenda. Chrétien reached out to leaders and organizations in an 
unprecedented way.431  The pressure of the yearly summit, along with the pressure Chrétien may have felt to leave 
a lasting legacy, contributed to the impetus to achieve success. Supporting and promoting the AAP fit well with the 
Canadian government’s goals for CIDA and Canadian development assistance.  
This thesis has argued that under the guidance of Chrétien, Canada was a leader in developing the G8’s 
Africa policy, working at home and abroad to initiate change. It argued that the MS model is well suited to serve as 
a tool to aid in the understanding of policy, and that it is adaptable enough to fit the case of Canadian foreign 
policy. The analysis of a head of government as a PE is a unique contribution to the MS model. It showed how the 
G8 produced a “uniquely high number of innovations and ambitious commitments to Africa.”432 Lastly, it 
contributes to the literature on the Kananaskis summit itself, showing how it was an unusually successful and 
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